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INTRODUCTION
Parens patriae, literally "parent of the country," is the govern-
ment's power and responsibility, beyond its police power over all
citizens, to protect, care for, and control citizens who cannot take care
of themselves, traditionally "infants, idiots, and lunatics,"' and "who
have no other protector."2 The doctrine took on (or reclaimed') its
protective character at the abolition of feudal tenures in 1660,' and
has been, since then, imbued with the solicitous concern typical of
equity!
Like most protection, governmental actions based in the parens
patriae power result not only in protection but also in increased limi-
tations and even hardship for those protected and for others. For
example, protecting children from enforcement of their contracts for
non-necessaries may make knowledgeable people unwilling to enter
into such contracts with minors though the contract may be of ad-
vantage to the child . Mandatory court supervision of custody and
1. A.S. OpP9, WHARTON'S LAw LEXICON 730 (14th ed. 1938). Only the doctrine's
application to children will be discussed here, although much of what is said may ap-
ply to other protected groups as well.
2. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 445 (2nd ed. 1968).
3. See Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae: History and Present Status of State Interven-
tion into the Parent-Child Relationship, in IA CURIuNT PERSPECTIVES IN
PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL IssuEs 109, 119 (Sandra Anderson Garcia &
Robert Batey eds., 1991).
4. See Act Abolishing Feudal Tenures and Imposing Hereditary Excise. 12 Car. 2, c.24
(1660) (Eng.). For a thorough history of the doctrine, see generally Clark, supra note
3.
5. See Falkland (Lord) v. Bertie, 23 Eng. Rep. 814, 818 (Ch. 1696); WILIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOL. I. (Tegg 1830) (1765);
Clark, supra, note 3, at 119-22.
6. See Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 564-65 (Wis. 1980) ("Thus it is settled
law in this state that a contract of a minor for items which are not necessities is void
or voidable at the minor's option."). Courts generally recognize that the purpose of
the "infancy doctrine" or "doctrine of incapacity" is to protect minors from entering
into contracts with adults who may take advantage of them. See, e.g., Kiefer v. Fred
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visitation to protect a child's best interests following divorce may pre-
clude development of normal family respect, autonomy, and love.7
Social agencies must refuse to help children in need because doing so
would be aiding a runaway, contributing to delinquency, or some
other crime which agencies may be unwilling to risk committing!
Child labor laws prevent runaway children and children remaining
unwillingly in abusive homes from earning enough money to support
themselves,9 while parental or child protective custody rules preclude
Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wisc. 1968). However, this doctrine
also allows the minor to take advantage of an adult, in that such a contract is void or
voidable at the option of the minor. Thus, an adult would understandably be some-
what reluctant to enter into any kind of contract with a minor. The Haibman court
held that "absent misrepresentation or tortious damage to the property, a minor who
disaffirms a contract for the purchase of an item which is not a necessity may recover
his purchase price without liability for use, depreciation, damage, or other diminu-
tion in value." Halbman, 298 N.W.2d at 567.
7. See infra notes 179-184 and accompanying text.
8. Running away as a juvenile is a "status offense" in at least nineteen states. SCIENTIFIC
ANALYSIS CORPORATION WITH REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL WELFARE RESEARCH,
INC., THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS 1980, 183-86 (1981).
The Illinois statute on contributing to the delinquency of a child, 720 Iu..
COMp. STAT., 130/1-2a (West 1998), does not specifically address aiding a runaway,
but the court in People v. Rauhauser, held that a "house parent" at a private home for
children did not contribute to the delinquency of a child by providing his apartment
as a place for children who threatened to run away, in view of the fact that he insisted
that the children return home. Presumably, had the "house parent" allowed the chil-
dren to move in with him and not encouraged them to go home, he could have been
found to have contributed to the delinquency of a minor. See People v. Rauhauser,
287 N.E.2d 78, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
MASS. GEN. LAws, ch. 119, § 63 (1998) classifies harboring a runaway as a mis-
demeanor. Parental notification of a child's status as a runaway is required by the
Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, only in those states which already statutorily re-
quire such notification. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5701-51 (1994). "Each center... shall
develop adequate plans for contacting the child's parents or relatives (if such action is
required by state law)." 42 U.S.C. § 5712(b)(3) (1994).
9. Child labor laws evolved to protect children from working in conditions injurious to
their health. Several provisions of the federal act regulating labor, the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 etseq. (West 1998), speak directly to the is-
sue of child labor. Section 212(c) prohibits an employer engaged in interstate
commerce or producing goods which will be moved in interstate commerce, from
employing children in circumstances constituting "oppressive child labor". Section
215(a)(4) subjects an employer who violates Section 212(c) to criminal penalties.
Section 203(1) defines "oppressive child labor" as the employment of children under
a minimum legal age for a certain type of occupation or industry. Generally, that le-
gal age is sixteen. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(c) (West 1998). Although many of the
concerns necessitating such legislation have now been alleviated, many state statutes
2000]
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the children's being viewed as self-controlling if they are not first self-
supporting.'0 If children do manage to earn money, their earnings be-
long to their parents, and, while many parents choose to refrain from
claiming that ownership, the choice is the parents'."
The parameters of acceptable child and parental behavior are nar-
rowing, with definitions of neglect and dependency and the need for
supervision allowing ever growing numbers of children to come
appear to continue the prohibitions in much the same manner as in 1938. See gener-
ally Note, Child Labor Laws-Time to Grow Up, 59 MINN. L. Rav. 574 (1975).
It is quite true that the original child labor statutes were passed at a time
when children were often employed for long hours at low wages to the det-
riment of their health, education, and general upbringing. Circumstances
have changed. Children nowadays may be handicapped instead by the lack
of opportunity for work experience at an early age.... But one purpose
remains unchanged, that of preventing the injury and maiming of young
children.
Vincent v. Riggi & Sons, Inc., 285 N.E.2d 689, 693 (N.Y. 1972).
10. The definition of emancipation differs from case to case, according to the court's
interpretation of the common law in its jurisdiction and/or the statutory guidelines.
The following factors in determining emancipation were discussed in American Law
Reports:
In general, even in the absence of statute, parents are under a legal as well
as a moral obligation to support, maintain, and care for their children, the
basis of such a duty resting not only upon the fact of the parent-child rela-
tionship, but also upon the interest of the state asparenspatriae of children
and of the community at large in preventing them from becoming a public
burden. However, various voluntary acts of a child, such as marriage or
enlistment in military service, have been held to terminate the parent's ob-
ligation of support, the issue generally being considered by the courts in
terms of whether an emancipation of the child has been effectuated. In
those cases involving the issue of whether a parent is obligated to support
an unmarried minor child who has voluntarily left home without the con-
sent of the parent, the courts, in actions to compel support from the
parent, have uniformly held that such conduct on the part of the child
terminated the support obligation.
Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Parent's Obligation to Support Unmarried Minor Child
Who Refases to Live With Parent, 98 A.L.R. 335-36 (1980).
When a child leaves the family home with the consent of the parents, the child
will be considered emancipated. See Timmerman v. Brown, 233 S.E.2d 106, 107
(S.C. 1977).
11. HOMER H. CLARx, THE LAw OF DoMEs c RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 234
(1968). There are statutory exceptions to protect minors' earnings in a few states,
particularly those states in which children in the entertainment industry often earn
large sums. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7503 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. § 181.01
(1982); N.Y. GEN. OBIG. LAW § 3-109 (McKinney 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
§ 25-5-11 (Michie 1999).
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within juvenile court jurisdiction and, thus, its protective activity.' 2As
the numbers of custody disputes rise," usually in divorce cases or pa-
ternity proceedings, courts acquire ongoing supervision of many
childhoods, and the state attends to details of proper child rearing in
new and more pervasive ways. 14 It is sometimes asserted that the state
12. A succinct definition of child neglect is provided by the District of Columbia statute.
This statute defines a neglected child as one
who is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education
as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical,
mental, or emotional health, and the deprivation is not due to the lack
of financial means of his parent, guardian, or other custodian.
D.C. CODE ANN., § 16-2301(9)(B) (1973).
A less helpful definition is provided by an Alaska statute which defines abuse or
neglect as "physical injury or neglect, mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation,
or maltreatment of a child under the age of 18 by a person under circumstances that
indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby." ALAsKc
STAT. § 47.17.290(2) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999).
These statutes are illustrative of the difficulty encountered when attempting to
define neglect. Margaret Meriwether raises the following questions with respect to
defining neglect: Should the definition focus on the parental behavior or on the harm
to the child? The author suggests two possible standards. See Margaret H. Meri-
wether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Time for a Change, 20 FAM. L.Q. 141 (1986).
The higher standard is that a child should be afforded the equivalent to care by a rea-
sonably prudent parent. The lesser standard would define neglect as "failure to
provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care." Meriwether, supra, at
158.
The author highlights several effects of the reporting biases created by a statute's
inclusion of particular definitions and/or standards. Certain races or socioeconomic
groups are singled out-precluding equal treatment in the legal system for all groups.
Poor, minority families are subjected to an increased number of unwarranted intru-
sions by the state. The under reporting of abuse in white, middle-dass families leaves
those children at higher risk. See Meriwether, supra, at 162.
The Illinois statute defines neglect as follows:
a dependent and neglected child shall mean any child who while under the
age of 18 years, for any reason is destitute, homeless or abandoned; or de-
pendent upon the public for support; or has not proper parental care or
guardianship; or habitually begs or receives alms; or is found living in any
house of ill fame or with any vicious or disreputable person; or has a home
which be reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the part of its parents,
guardian or any other person in whose care it may be is an unfit place for
such child;...
720 ILL. Comp. STAT. 130/1 (West 1998).
13. Annually, more than one million children under the age of eighteen are involved in
divorce suits in the United States. See HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 786 (2d ed. 1988).
14. The determination of custody is a difficult task for the court, particularly because the
decision is to be based upon a determination of the child's best interests. While the
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has the power to create or destroy families and has plenary parental
power over all child-citizens, particularly when families differ from the
cultural mainstream.15 Historically, the power arose only upon the
unavailability of the natural guardian, 6 but that is clearly not true of
modern parenspatriae, which comes into play upon far lesser defaults
of parental guardianship or child behavior. 7 This gradual broadening
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (amended 1973)
gives some very broad guidelines (see infra nn.112-113), the judge essentially must
make a decision without specific statutory guidelines. Often, the judge will have to
choose between two parents whose parenting ability is on a par. In those situations,
the court seems to rely on external factors in making a custody determination. For
example, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision that the
mother's cohabitation with a male lover may adversely affect her children's emotional
health and therefore the father should have custody. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.
421,425-26 (Ill. 1979).
As a practical matter, a judge making a decision in a custody dispute is simply
choosing the alternative which maximizes benefits to the child, or, alternatively, the
judge is choosing the least detrimental alternative for the child. See Robert H.
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face oflndeterminacy,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 255-62. Of course, the judge's
determination is influenced by his or her own personal values and beliefs about what
is best for children.
There are custody cases which are easy to decide. As Mnookin states: "While
there is no consensus about what is best for a child, there is much consensus about
what is very bad (e.g., physical abuse); some short-term predictions about human be-
havior can be reliably made (e.g., chronic alcoholism or psychosis is difficult quickly
to modify)." Mnookin, supra, at 26
15. See, e.g., AISTOTLE, THE POLITICS at bk. VIII, ch. 1 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin
Books 1970) ("all citizens-belong to the state"); DONALD FORD, CHILDREN, COURTS
AND CARING 11 (Constable 1975) (community must increase "involvement in the
lives of [those] ... who ... slip out of the mainstream or come into conflict with the
norms prevailing in society"); Mercein v. People ex rel. Barby, 1840 WL 3648, *23
(N.Y.) ("There is no parental authority independent of [its source] the supreme
power of the state.")
16. See Clark, supra note 3, at 109-10, 116.
17. The state, under its parenspatriae power, can become a powerful coercive force on
the family both by interfering with parental upbringing of children and by proscrib-
ing certain activities for children. "Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well
being, the state as parenspatriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). While as a general proposition it
may be true that such force is in the best interests of the children because it is a pro-
tective force, as a practical matter, the coercive force of the state may become
disruptive of the family.
While the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder held that the state could not
compel Amish parents to send their children to school until age sixteen, the Court
emphasized the historically demonstrated religious conviction of the Amish people in
holding that the state, through its parens patriae power, could not intervene in the
[Vol. 6:381
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of the government's parenspatriae power calls for thoughtful attention
and philosophical limitation if the family as we have thought of it is
not to disappear altogether. The divorce rate and the acceptability of
single parenthood have already led to a sharp increase in one-parent
homes;18 even if we were to allow the state to replace the absent par-
ent, it should be done intentionally and with forethought, not by
accidental expansion of the governmental role without consideration
of the effects of such actions or the broad principles involved. 9
This paper will turn to philosophy to seek material for limiting
the exercise of parens patriae power. A significant reduction of the
government's role will better serve the modern concern for child
rearing which is this century's re-definition of best interests.
Amish community's religious practice. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-
19, 234-35 (1972).
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a
long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society,
the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of
their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life,
the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of
Old Order Amish communities and their religious organization, and the
hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as
to others.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
It would be very difficult for a small, more recently started religious group to
use the rationale of Yoder either to remove children from school at the age of fourteen
or to home school them.
Three years after Yoder, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a district court
decision that corporal punishment of a child in a school setting, expressly against the
wishes of the mother, denied neither the child nor the mother any constitutionally
protected rights. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 296, 299-303 (M.D.N.C
1975), affid, 423 U.S. 907 (1975). The mother argued that her right to make disci-
pline choices as a parent was fundamental. See Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 298-99. The
court stated that such decisions as Meyer and Pierce should not be interpreted so as to
"enshrine parental rights." Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 299.
The state's power asparenspatriae is probably most notorious in the area of ne-
glect and abuse proceedings. Because abuse and neglect statutes are extremely
inconsistent from state to state, the discretionary power of the court raises questions
and concerns in these cases. See infra notes 98-99.
18. See infra, notes 130-131.
19. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. Rev. 1803, 1815-17, 1835-39 (1985); Lee E. Teitelbaum,
Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 430, 437-39 (1985).
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I. PHILOSOPHY
A. Introduction
Philosophers have long addressed the roles of government and
law in society; some reference has been made to the role of family;
little or no material discusses children's places vis-a-vis any of these.
Generally, the difference of opinion over state supremacy or family
supremacy and areas where each should be paramount is as present in
philosophical history as in legal history. Therefore, the basic dilemma
cannot be resolved by turning to the philosophers for guidance. It can,
however, be further illumined: "[Qjuestions about the nature of fam-
ily cannot be extricated from questions about the nature of the state
and of the good society."20 "[A]ssumptions based on one solution or
another [to insoluble philosophical questions] are almost an everyday
factor in the legislative, judicial and administrative processes," 2' and a
rule or statute is a "concrete particularization of a consciously or un-
consciously held ideal." 22
Law turns to philosophy for guidance, although philosophy has
largely ceased to be concerned with law and extrapolation is neces-
sary.23 "Law as a field of speculative inquiry is a subject in which
philosophers nowadays evince little interest. This is a relatively new
attitude on the part of philosophers, and an unfortunate one in its
consequences for both disciplines. "21 -
There will be no attempt made here to construct a history of the
philosophy of law or government and no exhaustive report of the
philosophy of the family or the child in society. The aim of this sec-
tion is not to demonstrate that the dilemmas of balancing rights and
duties of parent, child, and state are resolved in the realm of philoso-
phy, but to show that philosophers can assist in asking the right
questions to lead to individual resolutions, to collective solutions
which avoid unnecessary trampling upon anyone's basic views, and to
definition of areas where compromise is probably not possible.
20. ROBERT DINGWALL ET AL., THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN: STATE INTERVENTION
AND FAMILY LIFE 211 (1983).
21. HUNTINGTON CAiRNs, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 18 (1967).
22. CAIRNs, supra note 21, at 19.
23. See CAIRNS, supra note 21, 27-28.
24. CAMINS, supra note 21, at 1.
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B. The Role of Government
Throughout most of human history, the task of resolving the
most crucial social problems has been consigned to govern-
ments.... because of the widely held belief that only
governments are competent to achieve just and efficient so-
lutions to social problems . . . , but [history] also records a
recurrent theme of dissent. [Some argue] that many of the
social problems not actually caused by governments could
have been expected to find their own resolutions if govern-
ments had not intervened .... Government does require
justification. It is a human creation, the product of deliber-
ate human action.25
Starting from the premise that coercion without good reason is
morally unacceptable, philosophers supportive of anarchy conclude
that "government is morally unacceptable; it should be abandoned," 26
because "coercion in society may be controlled without resorting to
government,"27 which ends up being more coercive of more people
more often than is necessary. Social control by the threat of self-help
retaliation, offers of reciprocity or threats to withdraw it, and social
and supernatural sanctions (such as gossip and ridicule or witchcraft
accusations) is possible in some communities. 28 The transition to a
stateless society could be made by neighborhood cooperation, coop-
eration of fellow employees, and other voluntary associations. 2,
This line of philosophical thought would abolish the doctrine of
parens patriae by obliterating the governmental power in which it re-
sides. Child protection would revert to community control with
norms and standards informally enforced in ways which might be
reminiscent of the Anglo-Saxon kindred. Neighbors, friends, or rela-
tives might rescue an abused infant; an older child might run away
from home, without state interference. On the other hand, parents
might abuse children, also without state interference. Rescuers and
25. JOHN T. SANDERS, THi ETHICAL ARGUMENT AGAINST GOVERNMENT at vii-x (1980).
26. SANDERS, supra note 25, at 240.
27. SANDERS, supra note 25, at xiv, n.7. See generally, Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHI-
LOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (discussing
the principles of coercion).
28. Se MICHAEL TAYLOR, CoMMuNITY, ANARcHY AND LIBERTY 91 (1982).
29. See TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 166-71.
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parents might snatch a child back and forth between them. However,
all these events occur in the present system, sometimes with the state
as one of the harmful contenders.
The absence of government would not necessarily mean the end
of formal dispute resolution, although it would bring the end of law
enforcement as we know it. Private dispute resolution by arbitration
and mediation could comfortably continue without government, and
could be used, as is already common, in disputes concerning children.
A more widely held philosophical position is that government is
necessary but should be limited. The aim of government is to protect
liberty, to protect the weak from the strong, and to allow for the hu-
man truth that people are not governed by reason all or most of the
time and must, therefore, sometimes be coerced by an authority with
the power to carry out its threats.0 However, "that government is best
which governs least."31 Government should be formed and controlled
by the consent of the governed. Enforceable law is preferable to pri-
vate force, and one or the other will prevail, but injustice done by the
government itself must constantly be expected, prevented, and lim-
ited.3 Human beings will compete and use force against one another
and need to submit to agreed restraints for mutual peace and benefit.
This is, of course, the school of thought upon which United States
democracy was founded and English monarchy reformed.
In such a system, parents are seen as primary protectors and
nurturers of their children, but the state may interfere by assisting
30. See BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, TRATATUS THEoLOGIco-PoLInIcus 270-86 (Triibner &
Co. 1862) (1670).
31. JOHN LocKE, Two TRFAnrsas o GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690). Please note that the Locke citations throughout this article refer
to sections within "The Second Treatise of Government."
32. According to Locke:
Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent,
no one can be put out of this Estate and subjected to the Political Power of
another, without his own Consent. The only way whereby any one devests
himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by
agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for their
comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure
Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are
not of it.
LocKE, supra note 31, at § 95.
33. See CAIRNS, supra note 21, at 211-12 (discussing Francis Bacon's theory of the origin
of law and justice).
34. SeeTHoxAs HOBBES, LEviATHAN ch. XVII, at 87 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1973) (1651).
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them in these tasks or by supplanting them as mandated by rules
made with majority consent and limited by built-in safeguards against
governmental injustice. Parenspatriae in such a system is a recognition
that the child's incapacity for self-care and self-protection demands
special solicitude from governmental authority when parents fail both
to provide the necessary care themselves and also to find others who
provide it. Problems with this system include creating agreed-upon
standards about both what are the limits of necessary care and what
the state should do with the children for whom it becomes responsi-
ble.
A third common viewpoint is that government exists primarily to
promote the common good, as well as to protect individuals insofar as
is possible consistently with the welfare of the greatest number. It is
assumed that common good and the good of the majority are the
same. Government is a natural part of human life, and the public
good is superior to individual rights.35 The modern welfare state is
founded upon such views and co-exists, in today's democracies, with
the individuality of the preceding view-impossible to merge, but of-
ten able peacefully to co-exist.
In such a system, parents may or may not be the primary caregiv-
ers for children, depending upon what is seen as best for most citizens.
The state may decide what is best and enforce its view. Parenspatriae
in such a system is a recognition that children's welfare, because of
their natural dependence, may properly take precedence over the wel-
fare of their parents or other adults. Here, the problem of determining
what is best for the greatest number of children becomes the primary
difficulty in deciding what should be the role of parents, communi-
ties, and government, and reliance upon divided expert opinion is
virtually inescapable.
A fourth school of philosophical thought sees government as the
benign ensurer of a transcendent rightness, be it the will of God or a
collective good independent of the greatest good for the greatest
number, to which the individual may properly be sacrificed. 6 An he-
reditary monarchy allows the state to be a direct revelation of God.37
35. See ARjsromi, supra note 15, at bk. I, ch. 2.
36. See D.G. CHARLTON, PosrwisT THOUGHT IN FRANCE DURING THE SECOND EM-
FIRE, 1852-1870 134 (1959) (discussing the work of J. de Maistre).
37. See G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (S.W. Dyde trans., Geo. Bell 1896)
(182 1). The extent to which Hegel approved the religious aspect of this view is highly
debatable. See P. WIENER, IV DICTIONARY OF THE HISToRY OF IDEAS 291 (1973).
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People are evil and self-destructive and need the absolute authority of
church or state to be saved.38 Any despotism which ceases to accept
citizens' ideas of what is good for them becomes such a system.
In such a system, parenspatriae is akin to the government's right
to control all citizens, not a special doctrine for protecting the help-
less; it merges with the police power. If the state is always paramount,
because it represents and acts for transcendent rightness, it may prop-
erly act for or against any individual person as that rightness requires.
Neither parents nor children have any right or power to interfere with
the state's needs, since each person's highest duty and privilege are to
serve, even by giving up life itself, that rightness expressed in govern-
ment for the good of all. Parens patriae is swallowed up in the
government's equal and absolute power over any and all individuals.
The child's malleability is an incentive for the state to assure that each
child will be taught to honor the state and, thus, the transcendent
principle it expresses. Therefore, children may be special objects of
governmental coercion, not because they need the state but because
they are needed by the state. While an expressed solicitude for chil-
dren might mask such a view, it must necessarily be an hypocrisy, for
the welfare of individual children can never be paramount in such a
system.
Parens patriae, then, can be a viable doctrine only in a society
governed under some form of the second and third philosophies of
government discussed above. With anarchy, there is no government to
exercise it, and, with a transcendent state, there is no solicitude for
individuals of any age or capacity, but only for their service to the
state, or the collective values. There is no need for special power over
children, since the state has plenary power over all citizens. The re-
mainder of this paper will address variations within the second and
third philosophies above, in which there must be government and
government must protect either individuals or the general welfare, at
least sufficiently to assure citizens' continuing peaceful consent to its
governance. With either limited government or socially beneficent
government, special rules and protection for children are likely to
arise, and parenspatriae is a viable doctrine.
He clearly did not share de Maistre's distrust of rationalism. See supra III at 22; see
also, I? FILMER, PATRIARCHA OR THE NATURAL POWER OF KINGS (Hafner 1947)
(1680).
38. See CHARLTON, supra note 36, at 134. Rational justification, which can always be
refuted, should, therefore, be avoided.
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C. Philosophy ofLaw
Most philosophers have recognized that human beings are greedy
and competitive, 39 not always rational,40 inclined to use force if it will
work,41 and otherwise imperfectly self-controlled. Therefore, a system
of law may be necessary to set standards for interactions among people
and to enforce those standards.
Some have believed that God, as creator, or the universalities in
human nature itself and the givens of the physical world in which we
live would, if we understood them thoroughly, lead to one particular
system of law which would work perfectly for our governance. This
system is called natural law.42 Its adherents 3 recognize that human
inability to discover fully that reality, or to agree upon what has been
discovered, forces humanity, as a practical matter, to have a less than
ideal system of law, and to limit the power of the imperfect legal sys-
tem devised. 4 Some also believe that some regulation in areas without
significance in natural law may be based on arbitrary choices by the
majority. 5 Legal change will involve correcting mistakes and incorpo-
rating new discoveries as we strive to make the system ever more like
the natural ideal.
The nominalists, on the other hand, believe that there is a wide
variety of equally good and possible systems of law and that a society
simply creates one of these as well as it can.46 Law, therefore, is made,
39. See HOBBES, supra note 34, at 49-50.
40. See DE SPINOZA, supra note 30, at 259-69.
41. See CAIRNS, supra note 21, at 211 (discussing Bacon's theory of the origin of law and
justice).
42. See generally, AmsTOTLE, supra note 15; BLACKSTONE, supra note 5; PLATO, THE RE-
unc (Henry Davis trans., M. Walter Dunne 1901) (circa 380 B.C.); DE SPINOZA,
supra note 30.
43. See CAIRNs, supra note 21, at 556-57.
44. See, e.g., LoCKE, supra note 31, at % 134-42.
45. See, e.g., BLACK TONE, supra note 5, at 42. Blackstone's example is an interesting one.
He suggests that regulationof the "exporting of wool into foreign countries" is one of
these areas of indifference to God, the source of natural law. I suspect that most
would not agree today, for the exporting of wool affects the well-being of domestic
and foreign workers, the spread of disease, the distribution of wealth, the use of natu-
ral resources, and other areas of great concern to modern-day lawmakers. Better
modern examples might include rules about whether to drive on the right or left side
of the road or whether to stop, go, or proceed with caution when a traffic signal is
red, green, or yellow. The nature of things may well be such that some rule is desir-
able, but is unaffected by whether red or chartreuse means stop.
46. See, LocKE, supra note 31, at §§ 95-122; HOBBES, supra note 34, at 140-54.
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not given, and must be re-examined and changed whenever doing so
can make the system work better. The ideal is a pragmatic one, and
there is no search for natural perfection or for the right system of law.
For the nominalist, there is no such thing. All law is of indifference to
God and nature; law is a matter of human choice and convenience.
While members of these divergent schools of thought may grow
infinitely weary of one another's rhetoric, or angrily attempt to con-
vert one another, they are hardly unable to work together at law-
making. They are in perfect agreement in areas seen by the realists as
having no impact on natural order, such as whether drivers are re-
quired to keep to the right or to the left, and both are ready to
incorporate new wisdom into law, one group because it brings the
system closer to natural law and the other because it makes the system
work better. Problems arise over what is better and which new learn-
ing is part of natural law and which is new error. In those debates,
those within each school of thought are likely to oppose one another,
since their disagreements will be based on other values than views on
the nature of law.
Within this middle philosophical ground, where governmentally
enforceable law is seen as both necessary and potentially dangerous to
desirable individual liberty or general welfare, there is a wide range of
views on the extent to which government should make law for the
good of individuals as opposed to fostering liberty by doing nothing
and leaving them alone. Debate among holders of differing views on
that issue constitutes most of the rhetoric on the exercise of the parens
patriae power and most other important modern issues.
The philosophers have been less helpful in this area, perhaps be-
cause it poses unanswerable questions and elicits basic assumptions
about the nature of human life rather than rational analysis. For ex-
ample, under parens patriae, one question is: "Is it better that one
child be killed by abusive parents or that "x" number of children, who
would have survived in good health, suffer state severance of their par-
ent-child bonds because their parents cannot reliably be distinguished
from those who will kill their children?" Liberty favors letting one
child die, at least if "x" is a fairly large number; the greatest good (or
least harm) for the greatest number may favor removing "x" number
of children unnecessarily, given the same number value of "x."
Moreover, this fairly simple question assumes that death is worse than
loss of parents which is probably not universally agreed upon. It also
completely ignores the rights of parents. It is also silent about both
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tolerance towards parents who encourage early sexual experience, ho-
mosexuality, criminal behavior (i.e., teaching children techniques of
armed robbery, buying a child a "fuzzbuster," including a child in ac-
tions of civil disobedience); and about different views on effective
parenting (i.e., those who practice strict discipline with corporal t un-
ishment, isolation in a closed or locked room, burning a child with a
match to demonstrate that matches are dangerous, repeatedly telling a
child she is stupid or lazy or bad, or letting a child do whatever she
will if it's not immediately dangerous). It is clear that any discussion
of specifics will lead to differences even among those who can agree
upon a theoretical balance between individual and collective protec-
tion. The statements of philosophers on individual liberty versus
common good do not take us very far.47
Perhaps the primary proponent of individual liberty as it was seen
at the formation of American law was John Locke. According to his
view, all human beings are equal in nature, and none has the right to
coerce or injure another as to life, health, liberty or possessions. s He
believed law must include safeguards against government coercion
beyond that necessary to limit citizens' coercions of one another.
Some modern philosophers see his ideas as no longer influential," but
his legacy is certainly still present in the legal system. 51 Both the bal-
ance of powers among the three branches of United States
47. See, e.g., 2 HaNRuCI DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 26
(George E. Woodloine ed., S.E. Thorne trans., 1968) ("Private law is that which
pertains primarily to the welfare of individuals and secondarily to the respublica ....
What which is primarily public looks secondarily to the welfare of individuals.");
BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 124 (emphasis in original) ("[T]he first and primary
end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals.");
BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 123 ("[Rights are] of two sorts, absolute and relative.
Absolute, which are such as appertain [sic] and belong to particular men [sic], merely
as individuals or single persons: [sic] relative, which are incident to them as members
of society, and standing in various relations to each other."); 2 THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA 208 (Father of English Dominican Province trans., Encyclope-
dia Britannica 1952) (St. Thomas Aquinas died in 1274) ("Law is an ordinance of
reason for the common good, made by him [sic] who has care of the community, and
promulgated.").
48. See LOCKE, supra note 31, at §§ 4-15.
49. See generally, LocKE, supra note 31, at § 163-64.
50. See CAiRNs, supra note 21, at 336 (saying that Locke's practical influence was gone
by World War II).
51. Locke's principles "were embalmed in the Constitution of the United States which
survives like an ancient family ghost haunting a modern sky-scraper [sic]." C.D.
Broad, John Locke, 31 HIBBERT J. 249, 256 (1933). The civil rights explosion of the
1960s and 1970s might have changed Broad's mind.
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government and the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution
serve to limit government's actions by preserving individual liberty,
even of those whom the majority would oppress, and assuring that
elected officials reniain responsive to the public. The more prevalent
view today, however, appears to be the general welfare view.
D. Philosophy ofFamily
Family has been little discussed by philosophers, but two clearly
divergent schools of thought emerge from the few references found.
One view holds that families need and create the state by compact or
agreement, and the other, exemplified in Roman law, holds that the
state, by marriage and adoption laws, creates the families it needs to
serve the common good.
52
According to sociologist W.J. Goode,
[t]he earliest moral and ethical writings suggest that a society
loses its strength if people fail in their family obligations...
[P]hilosophers, reformers, and religions, as well as secular
leaders, have throughout history been at least implicitly
aware of the importance of family patterns as a central ele-
ment in the social structure ......
For example, Blackstone believed that "[S]ingle families ...
formed the first natural society, among themselves."54 The purpose of
natural law
is to preserve and further the natural community .... The
community of husband and wife serves 'to preserve the hu-
man race.' ... The community of parents and children is
cultivated and preserved by the parents for the pleasure of
enjoying grateful children, and by the children in order that
they themselves may reach perfection.55
52. See J. B. MOYLE, IMPERATORIS INSTINIANI INSTITUTIONUM, LIBRI QUATTUOR, WITH
INTRODUCTIONS, COMMENTARY, AND ExcuRsus 16-19 (2d ed., Clarendon 1890)
(1877) (Justinian first wrote this material in about 532 A.D.).
53. W. J. GOODE, THE FAMILY 1-2(1964).
54. BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 47.
55. CuRNes, supra note 21, at 329 (discussing the ideas of Leibzig).
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Men and women are brought together by their sex drive, which pro-
duces children, which leads to human societies because parents cannot
meet all family needs alone.56 Some societies are organized in larger
kinship groups, and kinship feeling, not sex drive, may be the basis of
human society.57 Procreation gives parents the duty to rear their chil-
dren, which gives parents the right to control their children until the
latter are self-supporting.58 The family existed before the political or-
ganization of society, but only the political powers have lawmaking
authority, which distinguishes government authority from a father's
authority over children.59 "The state is intended to enable all, in their
house-holds and their kinships, to live well, meaning by that a full and
satisfying life.60 ... [I] t is not right... that any of the citizens should
think that he belongs just to himself; all citizens belong to the
state. .,,6, All children should be taken from their parents and raised
together by specialists in child care.62
It is clear from this hodge-podge of views that family-state ten-
sions have a long history and little hope of theoretical resolution. If
families exist as sub-divisions of the state, the state may interfere with
family relationships at will. If families are the basic, natural societal
unit, with government a creature serving at their will, it would be in-
consistent for government to interfere in family relationships at all.
Clearly a middle way has been chosen in modern human societies, but
the basic theoretical difference remains unresolved.
Several modern writers have struggled with this issue at some
length, attempting to justify parens patriae intervention to protect
children from some parents and, at the same time, to preserve and
protect families which are not a danger to the children who live in
them. Parents "sometimes fall unacceptably short of the moral min-
ima that limit their paternalistic [sic] role, and children sometimes
rebel against the wisdom that is exercised on their behalf. And so the
56. See DAVID HUME, A TEATISE op HuMAN NATURE 486 (LA. Selby-Bigge & P.H.
Nidditch eds., 2d. ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1739).
57. See CumRs, supra note 21, at 377 (criticizing Hume).
58. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILosoPHY OF LAw 114-15 (William Hastie trans.,
1887) (1796).
59. See LocKE, supra note 31, at §§ 52-94.
60. SeeAiusToTIo=, supra note 15, at bk. III, ch. 9.
61. SeeArsTomE, supra note 15, at bk. VIII, ch. 1.
62. See PLATO, supra note 42, at 174; see also THOMAS MoRE, UTopI 58-63 (P.K.
Marshall trans., Washington Square Press 1965) (1516) (children live in families, but
eat and are educated communally).
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state also exercises a parens patriae function ... ", and compels both
parent and child for the child's good.63 "Domestic life is only partially
governed by political law, which leaves the greater portion of its rights
and duties to be ruled by the less tangible dictates of the moral law...
[because] the relations governed by the code of the Family are natural,
and essential to the existence of the human race ....
All families have dependent children, for every child is born
completely dependent and remains so for years .... [The
children in even the most affluent families do need assis-
tance. They obtain it, of course, from their parents or from
other members of the family .... In short, every major
public welfare program is a supplement to similar forms of
welfare benefits normally provided by the family.... [T]he
most important welfare institution in our society is the fam-
ily . .. 6 [N]ot every hungry child has an ethical claim
against me to be provided with adequate nutrition; my child
does because of his or her need for food together with the
fact that he or she is related to me as my child. And an or-
phan might well have an ethical claim against his or her state
to be provided with food because of his or her relation as a
citizen or a subject of that state."
Family law in England and the United States was derived largely
from Roman Catholic canon law which was, in turn, derived from
Roman law. The Roman law's view that families were created by the
state to assist social organization survived well into this century. The
state's interest in marriage prevented its dissolution except upon proof
in court of serious marital fault by one spouse against the other or
against the marriage itself. Families were protected from initrafamily
tort actions or any other court interference in on-going marriages."
63. JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 143 (1983).
64. GtAus, ELEMENTS OF RoMAN LAw 47 (Edward Poste trans., 2d. ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1875) (Gaius first wrote this material in about 161 A.D.). Gaius goes on to
compare human and animal families and concludes that family care of offspring is
the natural order of things.
65. CARL WELLMAN, WELFARE RIGHTS 29-30 (1982).
66. WELLMAN, supra note 65, at 35.
67. See McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); see also, JUDITH AREEN,
FAmiLY LAw 101 n.2 (4th ed. 1999) (family privacy); CLARK, supra note 11, at 252-
260 (torts).
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Contraception and abortion were prohibited68 Only recently have
these rules given way to no-fault divorce, abrogation of tort immuni-
ties, property and contract actions between still-married spouses, and
legalized use of contraceptives and abortion. Those who had children
without having been married were not legal families, and they and
their illegitimate children were without legal family status. 69 Only re-
cently have these rules given way to rights of illegitimate children and
unwed fathers; to enforcement of cohabitation contracts; and to artifi-
cial insemination statutes, sperm banks, and surrogate mother
contracts. 70 This shift allows individuals much more freedom to ar-
range their natural, biological and affinity relationships as they will,
and it substitutes protection of natural families or of individual liberty
for protection of legal families.71 In startling deviation from the trend
the United States Supreme held that, since the state has no say in a
woman's first-trimester abortion decision, it cannot delegate any say
to the father of the unborn child.72 This assumption that parental
68. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Conn. 381 U.S. 476
(1965).
69. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 155-56.
70. See Clark, supra note 3, at 126-28.
71. The question of what constitutes a family will be discussed in a later section. The
issue is of central importance to modern family law, but was not, apart from the non-
family definition for unwed parents and children, of interest in earlier times. The
power of a Roman paterfamilias and the Anglo-Saxon kindred rules both suggest a
legally extended family which is notably absent in modern family law. See Clark, su-
pra note 3, at 111-19.
72. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-70 (1976).
This case established that a requirement of spousal consent in order for a
woman to undergo an abortion was unconstitutional in light of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), which held that the
right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it
is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reser-
vation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a womans
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Although the Supreme Court in Roe and in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973),
expressly reserved the decision on the question of whether a requirement of spousal
or parental consent was unconstitutional, in this case the Court expressly answered
that question. 'We now hold that the State may not constitutionally require the con-
sent of the spouse. . ." Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69. The Court further stated that
"since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when the
physician and his patient make that decision, the State cannot delegate authority to
any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period."
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69. The Court in this opinion makes clear that the spouse may
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rights have the state as their sole source flies in the face of the idea
that biological families have inherent rights with which the state may
only sparingly interfere.
E. Philosophy of Children as Individuals
Family relationships have come "to be evaluated in terms of their
contribution to individual welfare." 3 The new focus on individual
family members, particularly on the children, is a twentieth century
phenomenon. Children were formerly seen simply as dependent
members of families or the state, and most references to them as indi-
viduals were related to their occasional incursions upon the body
politic, not to their individual welfare. It was thought that children
should not be held to adult criminal standards because they have not
yet had the opportunity to develop virtuous habits, 7 nor should their
testimony carry much weight because of their insufficient reason.
Children are subject to criminal laws if able to understand general
ideas and able to deduce consequences from them. 75 Yet, this general
principle would result in punishing pre-schoolers, who have this capa-
bility, and we should not hang three-year-olds. 7 All are born equal
because all can reason (except lunatics, idiots and children) and
therefore no one should be subject to another unless a clear sover-
eignty comes from God. 7 "[I]nterference with a person's liberty of
action [is] justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare,
good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being co-
erced."78
So-called paternalistic relationships are those in which par-
ents act on the presumption that they know better than the
child what is best for the latter. It is for this reason that
attain the right to prohibit his wife's decision only by deriving that right from the
state.
73. Michael Anderson, The Relevance of Family History, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE
FAMILY: NEW Di, EcnoNs FOR BITAIN 49, 68 (Chris Harris et al. eds., Soc. Rev.
Monograph No. 28, 1979).
74. See AQuINAS, supra note 47, at 229; CAIRNS, supra note 21, at 190.
75. See CAIRNs, supra note 21, at 86-87 (discussing Locke's theory).
76. See CAiRNs, supra note 21, at 87 (criticizing Locke).
77. See LOCKE, supra note 31, at §§ 4, 54-63.
78. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MoRaMIY AND THE LAW 107, 108 (Richard A.
Wasserstrom ed., 1971).
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paternalism toward adults or older children is so frequently
regarded as offensive or insulting. It is supposed that adults
and older children have a reasonable idea of what is good for
them, or, if not, are at least competent to take advice on the
matter. And so to treat them as young children is to derogate
from their capacities and standing. 9
Parents frequently extend childhood ... beyond the time
when it should be necessary."
[D]eep divisions in both professional and secular opinion
over the right approach to the problems of juveniles ... de-
rive largely from the dialectic between the demands of justice
on the one hand, and of welfare on the other, which has in-
formed the continuing debate about how to deal with
children in trouble.81
Our welfare interests include, besides health, the develop-
ment of our intellectual and emotional capacities, the
fostering of significant relationships with others, and the ac-
cumulation of sufficient, stable resources to enable the
execution of flexible life plans.8"
The best and most complete discussion of this subject found was
part of a book by Dingwall, Eekelaar, and Murray. 3 Their lengthy
discussion of the philosophical issues raised here explores the views of
"socialists" and "liberals," as they label the two extremes of the middle
position between what have here been called government to protect
the individual's rights and government for the general welfare. In a
hierarchical society with a head of household who could serve as the
family's link to the state, family-state relationships presented fewer
problems. However, conflict now arises because now the socialists say
law should forget the family and deal with each citizen "on the basis
of need rather than kinship" while "[l]iberals [want to preserve] the
family as an important check on the excess of state power.""
79. KLEINIG, supra note 63, at 4.
80. KiEINIG, supra note 63, at 74.
81. PHILIP PRIESTLY ET AL., JUSTCE FOR JUVENILES 19 (1977).
82. KLEINIG, supra note 63, at 143 (citation omitted).
83. See DINGWALL. ET AL., supra note 20, at 211-44.
84. DINGWALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 212.
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The peculiarly intractable difficulty presented by children [as
opposed to the old, the ill, the mentally ill, and the handi-
capped] ... is their social potential, the way in which their
moral and physical welfare represent matters of concern to
the future survival and character of the nation but whose
maintenance depends upon the invisible actions of a myriad
[of] caretakers.8 5
Because young children cannot seek help for themselves,
"[p]arental power can be restrained only by external surveillance,""
and family autonomy is lost.87 However, because a "charge of mis-
treatment" of one's child is seen as an allegation that one is outside
the common humanity of natural family relations which work, and
because intervention is so often resisted and cooperation may be se-
cured only by kept promises not to do much, agencies often fail to do
what is needed;88 even though neither liberals nor socialists object to
such surveillance. "Scrutinizing the discharge of power by one citizen
over another is one of the proper roles for the state recognized by
most liberal theorists.... The only body with the legitimacy to survey
the whole population is that which, in liberal principle, is accountable
to the whole population-the state."89
The authors are suspicious of the "moral panic about child mis-
treatment" because "[i]ts objects are not children as victims of
mistreatment, but mistreated children as threats to civil order, the
dominant image in English social policy since the Tudors."" How-
ever, they conclude that parents' rights are "duty-rights," like
trusteeship, and must be exercised for their children's benefit9' but
that the state, before it is allowed to intervene significantly, must show
both lack of responsibility in the parents and harm to their children.
9 2
It is clear that the philosophical views before this century saw
children almost as the property of either their parents or the state,
and, probably because little study was undertaken or knowledge avail-
85. DINGWALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 215.
86. DINGWALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 216.
87. See DINGWALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 217.
88. See DINGWALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 218-19.
89. DINGWALL ET" AL., supra note 20, at 219-20.
90. DINGWALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 220.
91. See DINGWALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 224.
92. See DINGWALL ET AL, supra note 20, at 229. The rest of the section cited, DINGWALL
ET AL., supra note 83, proposed specific changes in English law.
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able on the needs of children beyond physical sustenance, their rights
and needs were given no close attention. Now these rights and needs
are given a great deal of attention, but attempts to fit them into the
traditional philosophical frameworks have been less than wholly suc-
cessful. Also, ideas of what is right and proper in family life, or even
what constitutes "family," have become more diverse, making moral-
philosophical discussion along traditional lines much more difficult
3
and, simultaneously, more important.
II. THE CURRENT LAW OF PARENS PATRAE
A. Introduction
Wherever children are treated differently from adults in law, the
parens patriae doctrine is the likely justification, although civil and
contractual disabilities of children precede parenspatriae, logically and
historically. The sovereign's feudal right to the use of minor heirs' es-
tates-the original royal prerogative called parens patriae-arose
because minors were presumed incapable of managing their own
property, a presumption firmly established from at least Roman times
onward and long predating the historically traceable use of parens pa-
triae." That very young children are incapable of managing property,
participating in citizenship, or entering into business relationships
must have been apparent from the time of the first civilizations in
which people engaged in such transactions, and their disability must
have been recognized in law whenever and wherever legal systems
arose. Extension of that disability beyond the age of physical maturity
was a Roman phenomenon reborn in feudal times 5 and continued
into modern society.' 6
What is clearly derived from post-feudal parens patriae is direct
care and protection by the state. During the nineteenth century, the
role of the state began its expansion, moving to today's governmental
activism and changing what at the beginning of the century had been
93. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 19,passim; Teitelbaum, supra note 19, passim.
94. See Clark, supra note 3, at 110-12.
95. See Clark, supra note 3, at 112-13 and n.96.
96. See Clark, supra note 3, at 120-21, 123.
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the most private of public law into the most public of private law."7
"Judicial maintenance replaced patriarchy during the course of the
nineteenth century, and the fate of the family... became a matter of
public regulation. Judges and legislators emerged as custodians of the
family, carving out a new legal status for children and married
,,98
women.
This "custodianship" finds modern expression in juvenile court
acts, custody determinations, and infant-child adoptions. There is no
attempt here to present exhaustive descriptions of these areas of law,
but only to address the principles which prevail in their modern appli-
cation.
B. Juvenile Courts
The history of juvenile court acts demonstrates the ambivalence
of society in regard to child "protection." The reformers who cooper-
ated to create the first such statutes" included those who objected to
the failure of juries to convict children of serious crimes because of
jurors' reluctance to visit upon children severe criminal sentences,
those who wanted special efforts made to rehabilitate young and still-
malleable criminals, those who wanted to get gangs of loitering and
often immigrant youths off city street corners, those who wanted to
save or send away children of poor and therefore presumptively de-
praved parents, and those who wanted to stop physical cruelty by
parents to children. 00 Jurisdiction over minors in need of supervision
allowed attempts to identify as pre-delinquent, and to intervene in the
97. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA xi-xii (1985).
98. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERicAN HISTORY 167 (1989).
99. Illinois adopted the first juvenile code with passage of the Juvenile Court Act in
1899. Since then, almost every state in the union, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico have all followed suit and adopted similar acts. See SAMUEL M. DAvis ET
AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEcAL SYSTEm 742-43 (2d ed. 1997).
100. See DAVIs ET AL., supra note 99, at 742. The early reformers viewed children as es-
sentially good and were appalled by the fact that young "criminals" could be given
harsh prison sentences and jailed with adults. The reformers thought that juveniles
should receive care and concern from the state rather than be treated as criminal of-
fenders. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 99, at 743-44. Rules of criminal procedure were
not deemed appropriate to meet the end of treating juveniles as persons in need of
care rather than punishment and therefore such rules were discarded. The reformers
pronounced that children were to be "rehabilitated" and any procedures employed
were to be to that end. See DAVIs ET AL., supra note 99, at 743-44.
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lives and families of children who were truant, habitually disobedient,
or immoral.01 Jurisdiction over children who were neglected, includ-
ing those actively abused or dependent, allowed the state to protect
children from bad parents or from self-care when parents were ab-
102
sent.
Many such statutes did and do express a preference for keeping
the child's family intact once the court finds it has jurisdiction to
act.' Most make the child's welfare the sole or primary objective
(over societal protection) of the court's choice among dispositional
alternatives, which always include returning the child to the family
home, with or without conditions such as good behavior, family coun-
seling, etc.134 Juvenile criminals have come, over the last several years,
101. See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Refonn: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. R~v.
1187, 1189 (1970).
102. See Fox, supra note 101, at 1189.
103. The following New York statute is typical of state statutes expressing a preference for
keeping natural families intact.
[I]t is generally desirable for the child to remain with or be returned to the
natural parent because the child's need for a normal family life will usually
best be met in the natural home, and... parents are entitled to bring up
their own children unless the best interests of the child would be thereby
endangered.
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384-b(l)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1983).
104. One example which provides for the disposition of the delinquent child as follows:
2. Placing the child on probation under the supervision of the juvenile
supervisor, probation officer, or other appropriate officer of the
court... ;
4. Placing the child in an institution, camp, or other facility for delin-
quent children operated under the direction of the court... ; or
5. Committing the child to the state industrial school or to a state de-
partment to which commitment of delinquent or unruly children may
be made.
N.D. CENr. CODE § 27-20-31 (1991).
Arizona's statute provides for the placement of a delinquent child by the juve-
nile court to the following: 1) the care of his parents, subject to supervision by
probation; 2) probation, subject to court-imposed conditions; 3) a reputable person
in the community, subject to supervision by probation; 4) a private agency or insti-
tution, subject to supervision by probation; 5) department of corrections; 6) the care
of relatives, subject to supervision by probation; or 7) to the care and supervision of
an official of the child's home country. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-341(A) (West
1999); California's statute provides for any of the following dispositions, listed in as-
cending order of severity. supervision by probation; commitment to the care of a
responsible adult; commitment to the custody of an agency, private or public; place-
ment in a foster home; commitment to a juvenile home, ranch camp or forestry
camp; commitment to juvenile hall; all of the above plus restitution or community
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to be treated differently from other children before the court in that a)
they may be tried as adult criminals are and in the criminal courts un-
der some circumstances' °5 and b) protection of society may supersede
care and rehabilitation of the child if need be.'0 6 Also, in addition to
juvenile court supervision of the child, parents and others who abuse
children may be charged with various crimes.'07 Criminal prosecutions
of children or their abusers only indirectly involve the parens patriae
power of government.
Parens patriae allows the state to establish for children require-
ments with which adults need not comply. These include school
attendance, obedience to parents or guardians, disability to purchase
liquor, cigarettes, or near-pornography, and prohibition of work, will
making, voting, seeking public office, and engaging in sexual activ-
service; commitment to sheltered care; or commitment to the California Youth
Authority. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 727,730, 731 (West 1998).
105. A state may not "elect to proceed against a juvenile as if he were an adult" unless the
juvenile was represented by counsel at the waiver hearing. Kemplen v. Maryland, 428
F.2d 169, 170 (4th Cit. 1970).
The statutory framework for dealing with juvenile offenders contemplates
that those under the age of eighteen are to be treated as juveniles and that
juvenile jurisdiction is to be waived only where the offender is found, by
an exercise of sound judicial discretion based upon a thorough investiga-
tion, to be an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures.
Kemplen, 428 F.2d at 175.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-817(e) (1999) mandates five factors
which must be considered by a judge in a juvenile court in determining whether the
juvenile should be tried as an adult. The factors are; "(1) Age of the child; (2) Mental
and physical condition of the child; (3) The child's amenability to treatment in any
institution, facility or program available to delinquents; (4) The nature of the offense
and the child's alleged participation in it; and (5) The public safety." MD. CODE
ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 3-817(e)(1)-(5) (1999).
106. The protection of society is one of the factors held determinative in a waiver hearing
(in which the juvenile court decides whether or not to waive its jurisdiction and send
the case to adult criminal court) by the United States Supreme Court. See Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 App. at 566 (1965). The factors articulated by the court
in Kent are: 1) "The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
the protection of the community requires waiver." 2) The aggressive, violent, pre-
meditated or willful manner of the alleged offense. 3) Whether the alleged offense
was against property or person, with greater weight being given to an offense against
the person resulting in physical injury. 4) Merit of the criminal complaint. 5)
Whether codefendants in the alleged crime are adults. 6) The maturity and sophisti-
cation of the juvenile. 7) The juvenile's previous record. 8) The likelihood of
rehabilitation and adequate protection for society if the offender remains in juvenile
court. See Kent, 383 U.S. 541 App. at 566-67.
107. See, e.g., COLO. R.v. STAT. § 18-6-401 (1986); 720 ILL. Comp. STAT. § 5/11-6 (West
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404 (1999).
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ity.' °8 Failure of a child to comply may lead to a finding that she or he
is in need of supervision by the juvenile court or other agents of the
state.1 9
Findings of neglect necessarily involve the state in defining ade-
quate parenting. It may intervene only if the child is without proper
parental care as defined by the legislature or the juvenile court.11
108. "The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of
adults. This is peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of employment."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1943); see also, supra notes 1-10 and ac-
companying text.
109. A person in need of supervision may be defined as "a male less than sixteen years of
age and a female less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school in accord
with the provisions of... the education law or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or
habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful
authority." N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT, § 712(a) (McKinney 1999).
In New York, a parent or other person in an authoritarian position with respect
to the child initiates formal court action by filing a petition setting forth the allega-
tions of the child's non-compliance. The child, as respondent, is then assigned a
lawyer. A number of preliminary hearings may occur prior to the adjudicatory hear-
ing, where the child may either admit guilt or have a fiull trial. Subsequent to the
adjudicatory hearing, there is a dispositional hearing for a determination of whether
or not the child requires supervision or treatment. See R. Hale Andrews, Jr. & An-
drew H. Cohn, Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YaLE L.J.
1383, 1387-90 (1974).
Many of these petitions are withdrawn by the parent or dismissed by the judge.
See Andrews & Cohn, supra at 1390. Other possible dispositions are informal super-
vision or probation. Only a relatively small number of such children are removed
from home. Such placement may be with a relative, private agency, social service, or
training school. See Andrews & Cohn, supra at 1390-91.
In the case of State ex tel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977),
the petitioner was adjudicated a delinquent child for failure regularly to attend school
and was sent to an industrial school for boys. Among other charges, petitioner alleged
that the juvenile commitment procedure violated the due process clauses of both the
state and federal constitutions. This court held unconstitutional the incarceration of
children for status offenses when such incarceration is substantially similar to that for
criminal offenses. In order to do so, the court must expressly find that there is no
other reasonable alternative available and that the child is so totally ungovernable that
he or she is not amenable to any other type of treatment. See Harris, 233 S.E.2d at
329. This case is reflective of the movement begun in the 1970's to deinstitutionalize
status offenders. See ROBERT H. MNOOIuN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY
AND STATE 956 (2d ed. 1989).
110. See statutes cited supra note 12. Further complications arise in defining neglect
and/or abuse when the socioeconomic differences in our society are considered
within the framework of defining abuse and neglect. The District of Columbia stat-
ute, D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2301(9)(B) (1973), specifically states that the deprivation
of care must not be a result of the parent's financial inability. In other words, a par-
ent's inability, due to poverty, properly to care for his or her child should not place
him or her in jeopardy of violating a neglect statute. Another difficult situation which
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Standards vary widely and change with time,"' and most appeals in-
volve cases where the court's disposition has been to remove the child
from the family temporarily or permanently."2 The question on ap-
peal, then, is often not primarily the definition of neglect but the
appropriateness of the chosen disposition in light of the level or type
of neglect found."13 Questions about the limits on parental choices also
arises in neglect cases is one where the parents are physically, emotionally or mentally
handicapped. Should the standard be different for parents who are handicapped? Or
should their handicap be a sort of mitigating factor in a neglect proceeding? In a case
of mentally handicapped parents, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals af-
firmed a neglect finding which led to the placement of the child in the custody of the
maternal grandparents for a period of two years. See In re B.K, 429 A.2d 1331, 1331
(D.C. 1981). The father challenged the neglect statute on the grounds of vagueness
and the court held that a neglect statute must necessarily allow the court some lati-
tude in making such decisions. See In re B.K 429 A.2d at 1334.
111. Because of the inconsistencies from state to state in the neglect and abuse statutes and
the necessity of latitude for the court in making decisions in cases brought under
those statutes, experts are calling for a reexamination of the criteria for neglect and
abuse proceedings. The authors of Before the Best Interests of the Child suggest the
following as some of the grounds for intervention in the family unit:
1) A refusal by the parents to comply with such laws as immunization,
education and labor laws with regard to their child.
2) The adjudication of a child as delinquent.
3) A request by the parents for the court to determine custody.
4) A request by the parents for the court to terminate the parents' legal
relationship with the child.
5) Death or absence of one or both parents together with their failure to
have provided for their child's future care prior to their death or ab-
sence.
6) The parents' conviction of a sexual offense against their child.
7) Serious bodily harm inflicted on the child by the parents.
8) Some cases of refusal of medical treatment for the child by the parents.
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS o THE CHILD 193-96
(1979) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE].
112. Indeed, parents usually choose to avoid the difficulty and expense of appealing even
clearly wrong findings of abuse or neglect if no serious intervention is sought by the
child-protective agency, thus leaving intact an apparent record of long-time neglect
or abuse which may support wholly unwarranted removal of children later on.
113. In order for a court to terminate parental rights, there must have been parental con-
sent to the adoption of the child, parental abandonment of the child, neglect of the
child, or proven unfitness of the parents. It is not enough to find that an adoption
would be in the child's best interests. See Corey L. v. Martin L., 380 N.E.2d 266,
270 (N.Y. 1978). The very term "unfitness" has been attacked as unconstitutionally
vague. The Supreme Court of Kansas rejected such an attack on the grounds that the
term "unfit," "is not impermissibly vague as previously construed by the appellate
courts of Kansas." In re Brooks, 618 P.2d 814, 820 (Kan. 1980). The court held that
the termination of parental rights is dispositional in nature because a court cannot
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may be subordinated to factual disputes about what happened, par-
ticularly in cases involving allegations of sexual improprieties stopping
short of forced intercourse. Courts tend to approve state intervention
whenever the child-protective agency recommends it. Such recom-
mendations are often far too readily made by those who hope to
assure every child an ideal upbringing,"4 by those whose long dead
idealism has been replaced by healthy self-interest in making sure they
have "cases" (i.e., other people's children) to work on,"5 and by those
whose unhealthy co-dependence makes them want to fix every flaw
they can find, however small."6
Dependency cases involve different kinds of questions. A child is
dependent when the parents are dead, incarcerated in jail or hospitals,
or otherwise not available. Some such cases raise issues of what con-
stitutes unavailability,1 7 and these are reasonably analogous to neglect
issues. Others raise issues about what constitutes parental provision of
care (naming a non-parent guardian or other caretaker or giving the
reach the issue of termination until there has been a showing that the children had
suffered a substantial degree of harm. See In re Brooks, 618 P.2d at 820.
114. See LoUIsE ARMSTRONG, OF 'SLUTS' AND 'BASTARDS:' A FEMINIST DECODES THE
CHILD WELFARE DEBATE 102 (1995).
115. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 20-23, 95-106.
116. See ANNE WILSON SCHAF, WHEN SocImr BEcOMES AN ADDICT 30 (1987).
117. Parental unavailability may arise in a number of different ways. The most obvious
cases of parental unavailability would be those in which the parents have died, leaving
the children orphaned, or have abandoned the children. Less obvious perhaps are
cases where the parents are disabled either physically, mentally, or emotionally. In
these situations, the parental unavailability may nor be complete, as it is in aban-
donment or death cases.
Generally, the state becomes involved in such cases upon an allegation of ne-
glect. However, physically, mentally or emotionally disabled parents are not, by
definition, neglectful. "There are many fanilies in which one parent is incapacitated
or only one parent is living, but this does not justify the leviathan power of the state
to descend upon it and snatch away a child." In Re Adoption of Hyatt, 536 P.2d
1062, 1069 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
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child to a relative or neighbor for care)'", and these cases often arise
outside of juvenile courts and their jurisdictional definitions."9
C. Custody
Many potential dependency cases come before probate courts or
trial courts of general jurisdiction as custody cases, where, for exam-
ple, parents have died or been sentenced to lengthy jail sentences or
require long-term hospitalization, and other relatives of the child are
fighting one another for custody. 2"
The overwhelming majority of custody disputes, however, arise
between two parents who are seeking or have been granted a divorce
or who were never married but both want to raise their child. 2' The
courts decide between the disputing parents on the basis of the child's
best interests22 and, thus, become involved in definitions of good par-
118. Usually, courts will hold that abandonment must be willful or must demonstrate a
conscious disregard for the child's welfare. See, e.g., In re Ayres, 513 S.W.2d 731, 735
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974). Where a parent has made adequate provisions for others to
provide care for his or her child, it is not abandonment. See DS v. Dept. of Public
Assistance and Social Serv., 607 P.2d 911, 922 (Wyo. 1980). However, failure to
return for the child at the appointed time may constitute abandonment. See, In re
Robert P, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5, 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). There is no abandonment where
the mother leaves her children with relatives who properly care for them. See Hofick
v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18,21 (Tex. 1985).
119. Guardianship statutes may be found in probate, domestic relations, and other types
of civil proceedings as well as in juvenile proceedings. See ANN. M. HARALAMBm,
HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES 220-21 (1983).
120. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 580-82, 596-97.
121. It is fairly obvious that most custody disputes are necessarily between married, bio-
logical parents of children. Between the years of 1970 and 1980, the number of
divorcing couples increased to exceed one million divorces per year. See BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., CURRENT POPULATION REP. SERIES P-23 No. 84,
DIVORcE, CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT 7 (1979); see also, NATIONAL CEN-
TER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTA AND HUM. SERVICES, PuB. No.
81-1403, NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF MARITAL DISsOLUTION & SURVIVORSHIP, (1980).
The U.S. National Center for Health Statistics projected that 48% of marriages from
the 1970s to 1980s would end in divorce. See Lenore J. Weitzman, Changing Families
Changing Laws, 5 FAm. ADVOCATE 2, 4 (1982). Approximately one-half of those di-
vorcing families would have children., See Weitzman, supra at 5. From 1954 to 1975
the number of children whose lives had been touched by divorce had more than tri-
pled. See Weitzman, supra at 5.
122. "It is in the best interests of the child that... professionals [involved in children's
cases] always keep in mind that they are not the child's parents." JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN
ET AL., IN THE BEsr INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: PROFESSIONAL BOUNDARIES 154
(1986) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEST INTERESTS]. This statement flies in the
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enting. Unlike neglect cases, these are mostly situations where there
has been no prior challenge to the adequacy of either parent or ques-
tion about the child's well-being.'2' The courts nonetheless retain
jurisdiction to exercise continuing supervision of the child's best in-
terests, at the request of either parent, throughout the child's minority
face of the practice of the courts in the adjudication of child custody, visitation, and
placements. The authors share a preference for a "policy of minimum state interven-
tion in parent-child relationships." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEST IN rERESTS, supra, at 11.
"The risk that actions and decisions in child placement will rest on personal values
presented in the guise of professional knowledge is therefore great-and all the more
important to recognize." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BESr INTERESTS, supra, at 17.
There is no magic formula for determining the best interests of the child. The
authors emphasize that courts should consider "conduct, marital status, income, so-
cial environment or life style of either party only if it is shown that any of these
factors are causing or may cause emotional or physical damage to the child." GOLD-
STEIN ET A.., BEST INrTERSTS, supra, at 62-63 (quoting Or. Rev. Star. § 107.137
(1981) (emphasis added). Minimum intervention by the court is the best policy, ac-
cording to these authors. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEST INTERESTS, supra, at 11.
The question then becomes, "when should the court intervene?" According to a
prior book by the same authors as above, the goal of justifiable intervention must be
to create or reinforce a family for the child. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra
note 111, at 9. The child's best interests cannot be a justification for the intrusion it-
self since best interests is not clearly defined as a standard. "The goal of every child
placement.., is to assure for each child membership in a family with at least one
parent who wants him." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 5. The
authors believe that the danger to the family's integrity is great where the court can
intervene almost at will. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 16-17.
The authors therefore propose that the state should only intervene by setting limits
on parental judgment with respect to matters which society generally agrees upon. See
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 16. In these situations, the parents are
thus afforded fair warning of what will constitute a breach and to what extent the
state may intervene. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 16. Legisla-
tion with respect to matters about which society does not necessarily agree, such as
most neglect and abuse statutes, extends the doctrine ofparenspatriae to the point of
almost complete discretion in the lives of families which come before the court. Such
discretion may necessarily invite abuse of discretion as well as discrimination by the
courts, based upon the individual judge's personal biases and beliefs. See GOLDSTEIN
ST AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 17.
123. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d. 78 (N.D. 1981); In re Marriage of
Hadeen, 619 P.2d. 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). If the court suspects that both par-
ents are inadequate, the case can be referred to the juvenile court. If the court finds
that neither parent is a proper custodian for the child, the court may place the child
with relatives, if it is found that they are willing and proper custodians. In re Mar-
riage of Nolte, 609 N.E.2d., 381, 383, 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Ballard v. Ballard,
377 P.2d 24, 25 (Or. 1962). Or, as in the case of Wilson v. Wilson, 153 S.E.2d 349,
351 (N.C. 1967), the court may find both parents unfit and place the child with an
agency.
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and beyond,2 4 and will protect that jurisdiction by preventing the
child's removal from the state even by the lawful custodial parent. 25
Other custody cases involve parents versus long-term caregivers
to their child, and here, too, the child's best interest is the standard
for decision. 26 Some of these involve neglect, past or present, by the
parents, and others involve non-neglectful but lengthy absence of the
parents.
D. Adoption
Adult adoption was common in the Roman Empire for inheri-
tance purposes,'27 but the adoption of infants and children by those
124. Most child support orders have been limited to the child's minority. See CIARK, suipra
note 11, at 494-498. The states are divided on the question of whether and under
what circumstances it is in the court's jurisdiction to order support which extends be-
yond majority. CARc, supra note 11, at 717. Some states have had no statutes
authorizing the support of adult children, but many courts have authorized support
for adult children who are either disabled or incompetent. See CLARK, supra note 11,
at 495, 505. The Illinois statute does provide for the divorce court to order support
for an adult child's education and maintenance "as equity may require." 750 ILL.
CoMp. STAT. 5/513(a)(2) (West 1998). However, the states have been divided on the
question of whether the courts should order a parent to pay for a child's college edu-
cation. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 498.
125. See Clark, supra note 3, at, 139 n.185.
126. In 1966 the Supreme Court of Iowa was faced with a custody dispute between the
child's father and the child's maternal grandparents. The court found that the child's
best interests were served by remaining with the grandparents, with whom he had
been living for two years. Although the court found that the presumption of a prefer-
ence for the natural parent still existed in the state, and that the child's deceased
mother had named her husband as the child's guardian in her will, and that the
grandparents were older and might find child care a strain, the court still held that
the best interests of the child overrode any and all of these other considerations. See
Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156, 158 (Iowa 1966).
In the case of foster families, it is less clear whether "best interests" is the stan-
dard the court will use in determining custody or whether the court will require
termination of parental rights before considering the possibility of a custody award to
non-parents. In an Illinois case, however, the children were allowed to state their
preference as to with whom they would live-the foster paients or their natural par-
ents. The children in question were 12- and 14- years-old and had lived with their
foster parents for 6.5 years. The children appealed from a lower court decision which
would have returned them to their natural parents. The appellate court reversed and
remanded for further proceedings to determine what would be in the children's best
interests with great weight given to their stated preference to remain with their foster
parents. See, In re Ross, 329 N.E.2d 333, 343 (III. App. Ct. 1975).
127. See CLAuc, supra note 11, at 602, 652. In modern American cases of adult adoption,
there is no need to terminate the parental rights of the parents of the adoptee. The
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who are willing to provide parental care is an American creation based
on the state's parenspatriae power.as If a child is without parents be-
cause they have died or had their rights terminated by a juvenile
court, if parents have abandoned their child or been declared unfit, or
if parents voluntarily relinquish their child for adoption and that re-
linquishment is accepted by the state, the court may enter a decree
making another person or couple the legal parent(s) of the'child.
2 1
The court must first find that the natural parents are surely out of the
picture so that the child is available for adoption 30 and then must find
adult adoptee's consent to be adopted is required and deemed sufficient for the
adoption. See Dahl v. Grenier, 467 N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); In re
Adoption of Savory, 430 N.E.2d 301, 302 (IUI. App. Ct. 1981).
128. See Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Cus-
tody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1041-47
(1979).
129. A minor, defined as a person under 18 years of age, is available for adoption if each
of his/her parents has properly executed a consent for adoption or has surrendered
the child for adoption. See 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 50/8(a)(3), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)
(West 1999). In some circumstances, a parent's consent is not needed, most fre-
quently where a parent has been found unfit. See, e.g., 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
50/8(a)(1) (West 1999). In re Cech, 291 N.E.2d 21,23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972). The
rights of both parents of a minor child must be terminated in order for the child to
be available for adoption (even if the parents were never married to each other),
People ex rel. Slavek v. Covenant Children's Home, 284 N.E.2d 291, 292 (Ill. 1972),
except, of course, where one of the minor's parents is a party to the petition for
adoption. See, e.g., 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 50/8(b)(5) (West 1999).
In addition to the procedures set out above, the Illinois statutes provide that the
process in the termination of parental rights cases is allowed even where the identity
of a parent is unknown. See 750 ILL COMP. STAT. 50/7(A) (West 1999). Also, where
parents have surrendered the child to an agency or where the court has terminated
parental rights and appointed a guardian for the minor child, the consent of that
guardian or agency is required in order for the child to be adopted. See 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 50/8(b)(3), (4) (West 1999).
130. In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find that a natural parent is
unfit. The standard of proof applied is clear and convincing evidence. See 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 50/8(a)(1) (West 1999); see also, In re Drescher, 415 N.E.2d 636, 640
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980). Grounds of unfitness in Illinois include the following.
"Abandonment of the child"; "Failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare"; "Desertion of the child for more
than [three] months next preceding the commencement of the Adoption proceed-
ing"; "Substantial neglect of the child if continuous or repeated"; "Extreme or
repeated cruelty to the child"; "Two or more findings of physical abuse"; "Failure to
protect the child from conditions within his environment injurious to the child's
welfare"; "Other neglect"; "Depravity"; "Open and notorious adultery or fornica-
tion"; "Habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs"; "Failure to demonstrate a
reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a new born
child"; "Failure by a parent to make reasonable efforts or ... reasonable progress";
2000]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
that adoption by the petitioner(s) is in the child's best interests."' In
most jurisdictions, the child is thereafter the legal child of the adopt-
ers, just as though she or he had been born to them. In most states,
where the adopters are neither stepparents nor relatives and the adop-
tee is an infant, neither natural parents nor the adoptee have any right
to information about the other, even after the adoptee is emanci-
pated, 32 although this rule is changing. 33
"Evidence of intent to forego his or her parental rights"; "Repeated or continuous
filure ... to provide.., food, clothing or shelter"; "Inability to discharge responsi-
bilities because of mental impairment." 750 ha.. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(a)-(p) (West
1999). Such a finding (or parental relinquishment) may serve to terminate the pa-
rental rights of only one parent, leaving the other parent unaffected, and allowing a
step-parent (or other similar person) to share parental rights, by adoption, with the
remaining natural parent.
131. For example, in Illinois, the best interests of the child are to be the prime considera-
tion in selecting adoptive parents. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/15.1(b), (c) (West
1999).
132. Almost every state has a statute requiring the court to seal a child's birth certificate
and records of adoption proceedings. See OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 7505-6.6(c)
(West 1998 & Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN: STAT. § 193.125(1) (West Supp. 2000); W.
VA. CODE § 48-4-10(a) (1999). A showing of good cause is required to obtain a
court order to obtain access to the records. According to William Pierce, president of
the National Committee for Adoption in Washington, the legal trend is to give
adopted persons access to their birth certificates ifboth parties (meaning the adoptee
and the birth parent) consent to such access. See Silas, Reunions: Laws Open Adoption
Records, 70 AMER. PSYCH. ASSN. J. 38, 44 (1984). The argument against such access
is that the adoptive parents need privacy in their family life. Closed records foster the
freedom to develop bonds within the adoptive family without the past intruding on
the present. Closed records promote "stability in adoptive families and integrity in
the adoption system." Susan E. Simanek, Adoption Records Reform: Impact on Adop-
tees, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 110, 113 (1983).
Adoptees have an emotional and psychological need to know "who they are."
This need may arise for many reasons, including: 1) problems with personal identity,
2) feelings of isolation, 3) medical crises, 4) fear of incestuous marriage. See Simanek,
supra, at 118-120.
Various constitutional arguments have been made in this arena. The first is the
right under the First Amendment to receive information. Also, privacy issues have
been raised under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, there may be
Equal Protection and Due Process violations. See Simanek, supra, at 125. Constitu-
tional challenges have not met with great success. Most likely, adoption reform will
continue as it has begun, legislatively, state by state.
133. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423
(1992 & Supp. 1999).
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III. APPLIED PHILOSOPHY
In all the current law discussed above, the parents, not the state,
have primary care and control of the child. Government intervenes in
the parent-child relationship only upon request of the parents, sub-
mission of some arguably relevant matter to a court by the parents, an
alleged dereliction of the parents, or absence of the parents. Children,
then, in our legal system, are, consistently, first the children of their
parents and then children of the state. Thus, family appears to have
primacy over state.
However, the state creates and defines family, which argues the
opposite conclusion. Government decides who can and cannot marry,
creates and enforces familial support duties and property rules, decides
who can be divorced and upon what conditions, permits and defines
familial inheritance of property, defines paternity and, increasingly,
maternity and creates both by operation of law or court decree, de-
fines childhood or minority, and defines and limits emancipation
other than by attainment of legal age. This has much more the flavor
of the view that the state creates and regulates the family as a unit of
society and in accord with prevailing majority views of what a family
ought to be. Government creates families, albeit with the voluntary
cooperation of some of the individuals involved, and forces them to
exercise the responsibilities of parens patriae on its behalf as to most
children most of the time. Finally, it is the government that decides
when it should reclaim the power to act directly and parentally in
children's lives.
In this area of law, the balance between government protection of
individual rights and liberty and governmental care for children's, and
even the general, welfare seems to be struck in favor of the latter. First
of all, the doctrine of parens patriae itself gives government the power
to act parentally towards children, beyond its police power over adult
citizens and beyond protecting them from its own or others' coercion.
Second, government subjects children to parents' coercion by a rule of
law giving parents custody and control backed up by laws prohibiting
children from self care. Children are forbidden to earn a living, both
(1) by giving parents ownership of children's earnings and (2) by fore-
closing them from most jobs and from freely choosing non-parent
supporters and caretakers and by allowing parents to assault and batter
children to inflict reasonable corporal punishment. Third, it denies
children the vote and thus the power to affect the laws under which
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they live, denies them the right to seek elective office, forces them to
attend school, and denies them various pleasures of life deemed
harmful, at least to the young. Fourth, government itself oversees or
exercises parental control when parents fail, as government defines
failure. While it might be argued that these things protect the child's
later exercise of adult liberties, it cannot be said that they presently
protect the child from coercion. They are designed to promote the
state-defined welfare, not the liberty, of children or families.
It is difficult, and probably meaningless, to define liberty and
freedom from coercion vis a vis a newborn baby. If no one provides
food and shelter, the baby will die, and, society has more recently
learned, if no one provides love, the baby will be emotionally handi-
capped.'TM However, it is perfectly clear that the legal changes which
occur at emancipation, usually at age eighteen, do not reflect a sud-
den, concomitant change in the capacities of the person emancipated.
Somewhere between infancy and adulthood each child gains abilities
which the law does not allow her or him to exercise free of parental
and governmental coercion, although some gradual increase in legal
powers is permitted.135 Liberties which would be meaningless at six
months of age are not meaningless at five or at ten or at fifteen.
134. Emotional abuse or neglect is very hard to define and quantify. What is known at
this time is that newborn infants need to form an attachment to an adult, usually the
mother, who becomes a psychological parent to that child. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET
AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17-20 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter,
GOLDSTEIN Er Ai., BEYOND]. The continuation of the relationship between the psy-
chological parent and the infant is extremely important in the baby's growth and
development. See, ROBERTA GoirEs N, THE CHILD AND THE LAw 37 (1981). The
child's needs for physical caretaking are rather obvious but he/she also has emotional
needs for affection, companionship and intimacy. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND,
supra, at 17-20. "Where these [needs] are answered reliably and regularly, the child-
parent relationship becomes firm, with immensely productive effects on the child's
intellectual and social development." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND, supra, at 18.
135. Gradual increases in the child's legal powers are reflected in such things as child labor
law exemptions for agricultural work enabling a child to work within the agricultural
area at the age of 14. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1) (1982).
Also, the same provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act exempts child actors from
the constraints of the child labor laws. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. sec.
213(c)(3).
Driving privileges are extended to children between the ages of 15 and 17 de-
pending on the state, with the usual age being 16. These driver's licenses for minors
still limit their freedom in that such "licenses do not extend to driving for hire, driv-
ing oversized vehicles.., or driving a school bus." See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D.
KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 851 (2d ed. 1989). Most states also
further limit the extension of driving privileges by requiring parental consent before a
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The welfare of society is arguably promoted by assuring that
those young enough to be expected to be nuisances without external
control will be controlled by someone, that young adults will be edu-
cated to vote and work responsibly, and that the unemployment ranks
will not be swelled by those under eighteen. However, it is often ap-
parent that the welfare, let alone the liberty, of individual children
may not be served by parental or state control, mandatory school at-
tendance, or prohibitions of employment. As always, the line between
protection and disadvantaging coercion blurs into oblivion.'3 6 Parens
minor can receive a driver's license as well as the minor's parent's signature on the
application for a driver's license. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra, at 856.
Other cases increasing the legal powers of minors include: Tinker v. Des Moines
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503passim (1969) (a minor's constitutional right to free speech);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 passim (1954) (a minor's equal protection
against racial discrimination in education); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-68
(1970) (a minor's right to requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, even in
juvenile court, for a criminal offense); and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-55 (1967) (a
minor's right to counsel and right against self-incrimination in juvenile proceedings
where a crime is charged).
Almost all states have enacted statutes establishing a minimum age for marriage
of 18 for both men and women. See CLARK, supra note 13, at 89. Courts have also
increased the legal rights of minors in the area of reproductive freedom. An unmar-
ried woman under the age of 18 does not have to obtain parental consent in order to
have an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 72-75 (1976). However, several later cases have limited the minor's right to
abortion to "mature' minors. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408-10 (1981);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979).
136. In many cases, it is difficult to ascertain whether the interests being protected are
those of children or those of society. Given the fact that the interests of society and
children are not necessarily mutually exclusive, it is possible that both children's and
society's interests are being protected by laws enacted under the doctrine of parens
patriae. The Supreme Court of Illinois, reversing an appellate court decision, upheld
the conviction of two Illinois teens for curfew violation. The court stated: "The pri-
mary interest advanced by the State to justify the restrictions of the statute as to. time,
place and circumstance is the traditional right of the State to protect its children."
People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ill. 1977). Here, the court acknowledged
that the assumption that a child is protected from harm by curfew statutes is not al-
ways correct, but it held that the state was justified in basing the statute on that
assumption. See Chambers, 360 N.E.2d at 57.
Compulsory education statutes can fairly easily be justified as beneficial to chil-
dren. As the court in Wconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), stated: "[E]ducation
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." Id. at
221. Child labor laws emerged out of deplorable conditions in which child labor was
exploited to the child's severe detriment. However, today child labor laws may well
serve to exclude children from the labor market to their detriment rather than to
their benefit. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Society's interests are well
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patriae has been, since 1660, defined as exercisable only for the pro-
tection and benefit of individual children. 37 Today it would be
impossible to sort the rules of current law to determine which are for
children's benefit and which for society's as a whole, for many serve
both interests or shift from one to the other over time or from one
case to another.
IV. SYST.M BREADowN
There is growing recognition in all segments of society that
children are not well aided or protected by current law. Both federal
and state governments have attempted to fix glaring errors such as pa-
rental kidnapping, 3' non-support,139 over-intervention,' 40 and child
served by both of these types of laws in that children are not taking jobs which might
arguably be needed by adult members of society.
On balance, these statutes probably work to the benefit of most children. But
the balance remains fluid, changing as society changes.
137. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
138. See, Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994). Estimates of
the number of children kidnapped by a family member are both contradictory and
shockingly high: 50,000 to 100,000 between 1985 and 1988, see Andrea S. Charlow,
Jurisdictional Gerrymandering and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 25 FAm. L.
Q. 299, 301 n.10 (1991), and 354,100 during 1988, see DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY CHILDREN IN AMERICA 4
(1990). The latter reports that 163,200 of these children were concealed or taken out
of state with the intent permanently to alter custody. See FINKELHOR ET AL., supra, at
4.
139. See 42 U.S.C. % 651-69 (1994).
140. "Surveys found that in states with large Native American populations, ... 25 to 35
percent of all Native American children were removed from their homes and placed
in foster or adoptive homes at one time in their lives .... In South Dakota the num-
ber of Native American children in foster care was, per capita, sixteen times greater
than the rate for other children." B. J. JONES, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
HANDBOOK 2 (1995). The problem was remedied by the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978, which required Native American children removed from their homes to be
placed in homes that reflect their own cultures. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1994).
After the famous Baby Richard was returned to his natural father after several
years with adopters, the Illinois legislature precluded a recurrence by enacting a
statutory registry for unwed fathers, requiring them to register within thirty days after
the births of their children or lose all claim to those children forever. See 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 50/12.1 (West 1998).
Endless litigation about the custody of children is limited by statute in many
states. For example, see 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/610 (West 1998), which precludes
any motion to modify a custody determination earlier than two years after it is made
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abuse. 41 Custodial parents, visiting parents, parents on welfare, 42 and
parents litigating paternity or custody usually describe the system
negatively. Taxpayers are growing ever more concerned about the high
cost of a system which they see as nearly useless in saving children
from juvenile crime, homelessness, abuse, and incapacity for self-
support when they become adults. 43 Politicians respond with repres-
sion and rhetoric. 44 There is little to suggest that repealing all child
protective laws and eliminating all relevant agencies immediately
would greatly worsen the fate of our children. Some would die, al-
though perhaps not more than are killed now by abuse and neglect,
but many would be left alone to grow up in good enough families free
unless both parents agree or one furnishes affidavits that the child is endangered by
the present environment.
141. Most states have statutes requiring various citizens to report suspected child abuse.
See, e.g., Illinois Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, 325 ILL: COMp. STAT.
5/4 (West 1998). Also, recent research revealing that some children suffer ritual abuse
has led to the enactment of special statutes that define this kind of abuse and protect
children from it. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/12-33 (West Supp. 1999).
142. Welfare parents deserve separate mention here because they are pulled into the child
protection system at disproportionately high numbers and because "welfare" itself is
part of that system, its statutory name being "Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren." 42 U.S.C. § 601-17 (1994). Between caseworkers' inspections and
impossible choices between leaving children without care while one works or seeks
work and watching them go hungry for want of money for food, welfare families are
peculiarly susceptible to intervention and unable to fight over-intervention success-
fully. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 8-14.
143. Welfare rolls have dimbed sharply with the maturing of each generation. Numbers
went from just over 800,000 recipients in 1960 to just under 3,000,000 in 1972. See
MIMI ABRAMOViTZ, UNDER ATTACK, FIGHTING BACIK WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THE
UNITED STATES 73 (1996).
A report on Morning Edition in 1995 included the following:
The rate of crime is down across the United States, but a trend appears to be
forming. While the adult homicide rate is down by ten percent since 1990, criminal
acts by the young are on the rise. Dr. James Fox, Dean of Criminal Justice at North-
eastern University, refers to the next generation as the "young and the ruthless."
Morning Edition (NPR ra4io broadcast, Aug. 31, 1995).
This concern was echoed in the Washington Post, in an article reporting that, in
1980, adults in their thirties and forties were arrested for 110,000 violent felonies and
that in 1994 that number had risen to 270,000, with much of the violence occurring
in the home. Parents and other caregivers inflicted 500,000 serious injuries on chil-
dren and youths in 1993, four times the number in 1986. See Mike Males, Scapegoats
fir Their Parents; Hype About Teen Crime Hides the Real Culprits, WASH. POST, Oct.
13, 1996, at C1.
144. For comments from former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich,
see Katharine Seelye, Gingrich Looks to Victorian Age to Cure Today's Social Failings,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1995, atA19. See also, ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 7-15.
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of debilitating, destructive involvement of judges and caseworkers.
The liberals, though probably not the libertarians, still have hope of
making better ways for governments to protect endangered children
and would, therefore, reform the system rather than eliminate it, but
no one seems content with things as they are.
Why has it come to this? A growing body of work suggests three
causes: unrealistic assumptions and expectations about the outcomes
of intervention, frightened self-preservation by child-protective agen-
cies, and legislative and judicial failure to recognize that one parent,
usually the mother, and children constitute and function as a fam-
ily."'45 All three causes lead us to look at peripheral issues and to ignore
the children themselves.
V. MURDERED CHILDREN
Anyone with access to daily news can remember reports of chil-
dren killed by abuse in their homes, sometimes after intervention by
child-protective services.- In 1994, almost one-half of murdered pre-
school children died at the hands of other family members, and many
were killed by other people known to them; only about twenty per-
cent were murdered by strangers or unknown offenders.' Some of
these murders, along with injuries leading to lesser physical damage
than death, are the result of abuse by foster caregivers appointed
within the child-protective systems.' 47 It is not possible to say with any
confidence whether children murdered by parents after being returned
following temporary removal by the state faced equal danger in foster
care or whether those injured or killed in foster care faced greater or
equal danger before removal from their parents' homes. The system's
own records are inadequate, 148 and confidentiality hinders investiga-
145. See infra notes 152-188 and accompanying text.
146. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, CHILD VICTIMIZERS: ViO-
LENT OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 17 (1996). For a sample of specific cases, see
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, App. at 141-86, for the appendix titled
On Children Killed By Their Parents. For a discussion of the Lisa Steinberg case, see
ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 26-32.
147. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 29; U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERV-
ICES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1993: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL
CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2-7 (1995).
148. "It is still not possible to do any comparative analysis of foster care and adoption data
among states even on such simple issues as the number of children in care." Foster
Care, Child Welfare, and Adoption Reforms: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
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tion utilizing the records that do exist.149 It is also, of course, impossi-
ble to say how many more or fewer children would be murdered
without the system. What is known is that many children harmed by
family or other caregivers were known to the system via some inter-
vention long enough before death for life-saving intervention to have
occurred. The system is not working.
VI. DESTROYED FAMILIES
A. What Is a Family?
The first crucial issue here is defining what our society sees as a
family. The law, based on Roman law inherited via Roman Catholic
and Anglican Canon law, has traditionally defined family as those re-
lated by blood, by marriage, or by adoption. Absent marriage of the
parents when the children were conceived or born, no family was cre-
ated; if a marriage was dissolved (which required, in our early legal
tradition, an act of Parliament declaring the marriage ended), the
family ceased to be."0 Modern jurisprudence perpetuates this view by
classifying determinations of parentage separately from the rest of
"family" matters, 5 ' intervening to "protect" children when a marriage
is dissolved, 1 2 and ruling in many settings that cohabitation can never
make a family, even if children are part of the non-marital household
and even if (or especially if) the adult partners want to wed and are
Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation and the House Select Comm. on
Children, Youth, and Families, 100th Congress 364 (statement of Mary Lee Allen,
Director, Child Welfare and Mental Health, Children's Defense Fund).
149. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 311-19 (suggesting that confidentiality, touted as
protective of children, is really protective of the system itself and is permitted because
coercive intervention is described as "help," "service," and "professional treatment").
150. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 11, at 281-82.
151. The court system in many states keeps adoption and divorces-truly "family" mat-
ters-separate from parentage determinations, neglect, abuse, non-support, and
dependency cases-post "family" matters for the most part. In some states, the latter
are juvenile court cases, while in other states, all are "family court" cases. However,
when the same court does hear both types of cases, the calls are separated in time.
The respectable divorce and adoption clientele are generally not required to encoun-
ter not-so-respectable parentage or abuse and neglect clientele. See William M.
Kephart, The Family Court: Some Socio-Legal Implications, 1955 WAsH. U. L.Q. 61,
62; Paul A. Williams, A Unified Family Court for Missouri, 63 UMKC L. Ra.v 383,
383-91 (1995).
152. See supra notes 121-126 and accompanying text.
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not allowed by law to do so (for example, same gender couples).' At
common law, most families were formed by cohabitation plus intent
to live as husband and wife, but most modern states now require a
couple to obtain a license and participate in a marriage ceremony to
make a legal marriage. The way to formation of a legal marriage and,
therefore, family has changed; government has intruded more into the
process, but family creation still depends upon marriage.
However, change can be seen in some areas. Zoning and housing
laws recognize non-marital "families.""' Child support, custody, and
visitation fall within the same UMDA sections whether or not parents
were ever married to each other.' "Illegitimate" children are entitled
to equal protection with "legitimate" children in many circum-
stances.1 6 Some states allow step-parent-type adoptions by non-
153. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Matter of Adoption of Charles B., No. 3382, 1988 WL
119937, at *1 (Ohio Cr. App. 5th Dist. Oct. 28, 1988). Butsee, Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 64-66 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a state statute restricting marriage to a
female-male relationship discriminates on the basis of gender and is therefore subject
to strict scrutiny).
154. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-99 (1977); Braschi v. Stahle Assoc.
Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 49-54 (N.Y. 1989). But see, Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,
7-10 (1974).
155. See Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act §§ 401-07, 9A U.L.A. 263-399 (1998). But see,
e.g., Department of Public Aid, ex ret Gagnon-Dix v. Gagnon, 680 N.E.2d 509, 511
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (stating that the standard that visitation must be awarded to a
non-custodial parent unless it would seriously endanger the child does not apply to
never-married parents, although visitation in this case was ordered at the unwed fa-
ther's request).
156. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973) (welfare
benefits); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (paternal support); Weber v.
Aetna Casualty Insurance Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (workers' compensation,
children's benefits); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (wrongful death
of mother).
Inheritance cases have allowed some differential treatment of legitimate and ille-
gitimate children, apparently based on the possibly difficult determination of the
decedent's parentage in a probate proceeding. The cases are not entirely consistent
with one another, but it is clear that intestate succession is not guaranteed equally to
children of married and unmarried parents. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261-64
(1978). But see, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-76 (1977); Labine v. Vin-
cent, 401 U.S. 532, 535-40 (1971). No United States Supreme Court cases address
the meaning of the term "children" in a will in this context, perhaps because testatri-
ces and testators define the term within the documents, or perhaps because the courts
make assumptions to deal with children of the unmarried (probably, if so, opposite
assumptions for fathers and mothers!).
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marital partners. 57 Innovations in reproductive technology have led to
new rules for creation of legal parent-child relationships. A mother's
consenting husband, not the sperm donor, is the legal father of a child
born to a married woman as the result of artificial insemination with
sperm from a donor not her husband.5 8 In some states, a sperm do-
nor's wife may become the legal mother of a child who has been born
to another woman who was artificially inseminated with the father's
sperm pursuant to a surrogate mother contract.'59 In vitro fertilization
makes possible the separation of pregnancy from genetic motherhood,
creating maternity disputes between egg donors and birth mothers' 60
and various familial disputes over frozen zygotes. 16' A few courts are
creating new applications of old rules about challenging paternity
157. See, e.g., Tracy Baim, Illinois Court Allows Lesbian Co-parent Adoption, OuTUNEs,
Aug. 1995, at 15 (Fifteen states and the District of Columbia "have approved 'second
parent' adoptions by gay and lesbian couples. In addition to Illinois, the states are:
Alaska, California, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, New
Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington. Florida
and New Hampshire specifically prohibit same-sex adoptions by law.").
158. See Unif. Parentage Act, § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). The statute requires mother's
husband's written consent to the artificial insemination, but at least one court has
held that a husband who did not consent was estopped to deny paternity. His con-
sent would be presumed unless he could meet the burden of proving that he did not
consent. See, In re Marriage of Adams, 528 N.E.2d 1075, 1082-89 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988). But see, In re Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 637-40 (Ill. 1990)
(reversing appellate court decision).
159. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (intention of the parties en-
forced to give egg donor and sperm donor, a married couple, custody against the
claim of the surrogate mother); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 280,
281 (Ct. App. 1998) (baby is child of couple intending his birth, not of egg donor,
sperm donor, or surrogate mother); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480
(App. Div. 1994) (divorcing wife held to be mother against husband/father's claim to
sole custody where egg donor was not the wife). But see In re Baby M., 537 A.2d
1227, 1234-35 (NJ. 1988) (custody to father and visitation to surrogate who was
also the egg donor-, father's wife not legal mother and contract unenforceable); In re
Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 893 (Ct. App. 1994) (child raised by
father and wife, but, upon their divorce, joint custody awarded to father and surro-
gate mother/egg donor; no rights to wife who had acted as mother for several years).
160. See, e.g., Calvert, 851 P.2d at 776-78.
161. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601-04 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that divorced
parents have equal rights in frozen embryos, and father's right not to procreate pre-
vailed over right of mother to have the zygotes implanted, since she could possibly
procreate again with a new husband as the father); Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One
Way to be Born? Legislative Inaction and the Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REv.
993, 1007-08 (reporting that an Australian court held that frozen zygotes surviving
their parents could be implanted in a surrogate but that the resulting children, if any,
would not be heirs of the genetic parents).
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where no new technology is involved. This has led to both legally rec-
ognized biological fatherhood for genetic fathers even when the
mother's husband was someone else, 62 and to legally recognized bio-
logical fatherhood for mother's husband even when he is not the
genetic father and no "artificial insemination" occurred.' These new
issues, arising from new science, have greatly complicated definitions
of "family."
In some settings, of course, family has wider meaning than par-
ents, spouses, and children or relatives within one household. In cases
involving inheritance or familial foster/adoptive placements, family
means the wider kinship relationships. These relationships also in-
clude some legal rights such as the power to consent to medical
treatment, or heirship of the next of kin, or favored status in seeking
agency placements of children, or court appointment of guardianship.
These applications of kinship/family concepts are beyond the scope of
this paper.
B. Feminist Critique
There is a growing literature which asserts that governmental in-
trusion is directly related to the inability of institutionalized sexism in
the child welfare and legal systems to see a mother and her children as
an autonomous functioning family. Why else would the courts engage
in ongoing supervision of post-divorce parental choices, oversight of
parental agreements when divorce or a parentage decision is granted,
and intrusion into vastly more single-mother families than others?'
14
Why else would courts so routinely substitute the judge's view of what
is best for children for the single mother's view? The situation is not
only unfair to single mothers; it is also, and more importantly, de-
stroying the lives of too many women and children.
Single mothers are often well aware of this problem:
And our lifestyle is different. Like I tell the kids, we have a
whole different family structure. That doesn't mean we're
162. See, e.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854-55 (La. 1989).
163. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 111-12 (1989).
164. See AwMsTRoNG, supra note 114, at 14-20, 32-33.
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not a family. And the message they're still getting--like from
Social Services and staff-is that we're not."5
[I]n this mothering, you are engaged in a second marriage-
to Superpop, the state. Like the Victorian father, Superpop's
tone is that of absolute ruler, unwilling to acknowledge his
own transgressions but holding those in his charge to a rigid
standard of morality, behavior, and the following of his dic-
tated procedure. 66
Courts and social agencies intervene into mother-headed family
life in two different settings. For divorced mothers with custody of
children, the most common intrusions arise from fathers' motions to
change custody, enforce or enlarge visitation orders, or reduce child
support; or from mothers' motions to enforce child support already
ordered, and, in those states requiring them, mothers' petitions to re-
move children from the forum state. For foster mothers, the oversight
by social agencies and the effort to preserve the genetic family bring
about the most intrusions. For children who are physically and sexu-
ally abused, (in single-parent families and otherwise) intrusion comes
when child protective agencies remove them (and not their abusers,
even when one parent would still be available) from their families and
place them in other homes, often with strangers.
The legal system's reasons for intruding are different in each set-
ting. When divorced parents seek enforcement or modification of a
divorce decree, the court is simply resolving disputes--disputes which
at least one party has asked it to adjudicate. Foster caregivers do not
usually have legal custody of children in their care. Legal intrusion
occurs because the children are seen as wards of the court committed
to the temporary custody of child welfare agencies with the goal of
fixing the families of origin and returning the children to their par-
ents' homes. Finally, when the system responds to abuse of children, it
presumably seeks only to protect them from further harm, whatever
that may require.
For years, the law has accepted the idea that a child's "primary
caretaker" and "psychological parent" should be the favored
165. ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 261 (quote from a single foster mother).
166. ARmSTRONG, supra note 114, at 134.
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custodian.'6' However, although the definition of custody as including
the care and control of a child persists,'68 the shift from mostly
paternal custodians' to mostly maternal ones has been accompanied
by a shift of "control" to former spouses, judges, social workers, and
police. Our entrenched cultural stereotypes can easily see "care" in
mothers' hands; indeed, the new emphasis on nurturing undoubtedly
caused the custodial gender shift. However, maternal "control" sounds
strange and unnatural, and the system has prevented it. Judges, police,
and out-of-custody parents are mostly men, and social workers, while
many are female, are at least professional. "Mother" is the last bastion
of the feminine image-passive, emotional, irrational, weak, and
helpless' 70---obviously unfit to control the next generation and to be
head of a significant portion of American families. The word "family"
is rarely used in this context except for the pejorative use of "single
parent families." So control has been taken from custodians; families
have been destroyed by the separation of care from control; and now
everyone from Congress to media newscasters, to some parts of the
church tell us that mothers are the cause of family failure, the national
deficit, and juvenile crime. 1
The custodial mother must feed, house, and clothe her children
without money, or she must earn money without neglecting her child
care duties. She must also cooperate with childless social workers who
tell her how "to parent" and require her to attend meetings for which
she may have no transportation and lose pay, and she must go to court
to defend herself and her children whenever their father decides to
summon her there, again with possible lost wages and no transporta-
tion. Maybe mothers will learn to, or at least suggest to still-married
women, that they should stay with men who abuse them and their
167. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629 (Iowa 1997); Blankenship v.
Blankenship, 489 S.E.2d 756 (W.Va. 1997); see also GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND, su-
pra note 134, at 17-20, 30.
168. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 573-75.
169. See CLA-RK, supra note 11, at 584-85.
170. See generally, GLoRA STEINEM, REvoLUTION FROM WITHIN 217-20 (1992) (arguing
that across cultures and throughout history that which is feminine has always been as-
sociated with weakness).
171. See, e.g., Richard Moss, Editorial, Placing the Blamefor a Child's Murder, INDIANAPO-
ius STAR, Jan. 17, 1996, at A09; Thomas Walkom, Opinion, Ontario's Search for
Scapegoats Settles on the Poor, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 3, 1995, at A25; Francis Fox
Piven, Don't Blame Welfare Mothers fir Society's Ills, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 8,
1994, at 8D; Anna Gelbert, Letter, Blaming Mothers Is Dangerous, TORONTO STAR,
Apr. 21, 1992, at Al8.
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children, are addicted to drugs or alcohol, or have affairs. Or, maybe
they will suggest that they somehow keep at home men who desert
them, or refrain from having children without sufficient unearned
income or free child care to keep up adequate financial resources. If
they can't manage all that, maybe they will learn to go away and not
bother anyone, and relinquish their children for adoption or into the
care of orphanages. 72
Another particular area of attack on mothers is seen in all-too-
common events witnessed again and again by this author and com-
monly discussed when battered wives, welfare mothers, and feminists
meet. Mothers who report that their children's fathers are sexually
abusing them are accused of manipulating the courts and child pro-
tective agencies to gain control over fathers in divorce, property
division, visitation and custody, or other matters before the court. If
the allegations cannot be proven in criminal court, mothers are pre-
sumed to have lied; if parents are not living together, child protective
agencies often refer mothers to civil courts in the assumption that
those courts will restrict visitation and that caseworkers might better
spend their efforts on families where children are living with alleged
abusers. If caseworkers do testify and have not found enough evidence
to find that abuse has occurred, the court takes their caution over
mothers' certainty. Women do not understand why the courts do not
care what is happening to their children, and they often have no idea
why, or even that, they were not believed. Some judges have even ex-
panded their distrust to encompass the counselors (chosen by
mothers) who have been helping the abused children to cope with
abuse and system inaction. The children may often blame mothers for
not protecting them; if not, they may see their mothers as powerless,
and lose the confidence born of family autonomy. The child protec-
tive agencies, too, blame mothers for failing to protect children from
abusive parents (when the agencies do believe that abuse has
172. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 7-15. Armstrong describes her own reactions to
Newt Gingrich's suggestion "that the children of young unmarried mothers on wel-
fare should be removed to orphanages." ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 7.
My excitement stemmed from hope. And my hope was this: that in placing
the issue of welfare for single mothers in such intimate apposition to the is-
sue of state removal of children, the connections would finally be made by
women. That it would finally become clear: These are feminist issues.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 8; see also, WILLIAM Rva~k, BLAMING THE VIC-
TIM 86-91 (1971) (observing that welfare mothers, not poverty and social
stratification, are clearly seen as threats to budgets and values).
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occurred). This may be so even when mothers have moved out of fa-
thers' homes and gone to different towns to protect their children. If
mothers leave in order to protect their children, the divorce court may
not believe their allegations of abuse; if they stay, they may lose their
children because they are not protecting them. In many cases both
events occur, and mothers are ordered by divorce courts to cooperate
in visitation of their children with the children's abusers. At the same
time, they are threatened by caseworkers and juvenile courts with
termination of their parental rights for not protecting their children
from abuse occurring before they left.'73
C. The Need for Family Autonomy
Adopting a functional, rather than legal, definition of "family"
when the issue is the needs and best interests of children leads us to
examine intervention itself as a serious threat. What is the effect on
children when social workers, judges, hostile non-custodial parents,
and other relatives are allowed and encouraged to interfere with fam-
ily/household decisions? Under removal statutes and in litigation
about custody, visitation, and child support, the court becomes in-
volved in ongoing supervision of custody agreements, even though, in
over ninety percent of divorce cases, the family has made its own cus-
tody determination in a settlement agreement before the court hearing
required to obtain a divorce.' 7' These familial custody agreements are
the result of both the parents' relationship with each other and the
child-parent relationships.' 75 "The Revised Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act, written as a model for state legislatures, stipulates that the
court 'shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of
the child."' 76 In determining a child's best interests, the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act provides these guidelines: 1) wishes of the
child's parent(s) as to his/her custody; 2) wishes of the child; 3) inter-
action and interrelationship of the child and the parent(s), siblings
and any other person who may affect the child's best interests signifi-
173. In many years of working with victims of domestic violence, this author has seen
these events occur repeatedly, but she has not seen one instance of such disbelief or
presumed omnipotence directed at a father.
174. See MARLYN LiarLE, FAmILY BaEAcup 2 (1982).
175. See Lrnmr, supra note 174, at 3.
176. LIna, supra note 174, at 9 (quoting Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 402, 9A
U.L.A. 282 (1998)).
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cantly; 4) child's adjustment to home, school and community; and
5) mental and physical health of all persons involved.' 77
The complexity of family life is accentuated during the period of
separation and divorce.1 78 The issue is one of whether or not the
court's exercise of retained jurisdiction inhibits the parent/child rela-
tionship in a significant way. "When family integrity is broken or
weakened by state intrusion, ... [the child's] needs are thwarted and
his belief that his parents are omniscient and all-powerful is shaken
prematurely."1
79
When a parent cannot make a decision so fundamental to the
family's functioning as location of residence without obtaining ap-
proval from the court, the legal process has usurped the parent's
ability to be effective and to appear "all-powerful" to her young chil-
dren. The same is true when grandparents and non-custodial parents
can summon the family (i.e., custodial parent and child[ren]) into
court and persuade the judge to veto the parent's decisions.8 ° Since
177. See Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 402, 9A U.L-A. 282 (1998).
178. See LrrL, supra note 174, at 115-16. During this highly stressful timej the quality
of parents' relationships with children may be more important than the physical
custody of the children. See LrrTE, supra note 174, at 116. "A study of children in
divorcing families ... found that the children's behaviors were strongly affected by
the quality of their relationships with their parents." LIrTE, supra note 174, at 166.
Children who maintained a "high-quality relationship with both parents showed less
aggression, had better social relationships, and were more productive in their school-
work." Lrrr, supra note 174, at 166-67. Those children who maintained a high-
quality relationship with only one parent showed only slightly less efficient func-
tioning than those with high-quality relationships with both parents. See LIrT,
supra note 174, at 167. However, children who experienced poor relationships with
both parents showed the most difficulties socially and academically. See LITrT, supra
note 174, at 167.
179. GOLDSTEIN T AL.., BEFOREa, supra note 111, at 9.
180. In a recent case, a court refused to grant sibling visitation, not because family deci-
sions should be respected, but because the legislature had not granted visitation rights
to siblings and the common law accorded respect to parental decisions. See, Scruggs
v. Saterfiel, 693 So. 2d 924, 925 (Miss. 1997). Since most states now do have statutes
or case law allowing grandparents to seek visitation orders, such deference is often not
accorded to the nudear family unit, consisting of parents and children.
See, e.g., COLO REv. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1996); NEB. REV. STAT. §43-1802
(1998); Williams v. Spears, 719 So. 2d 1236, 1239-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(no grandparent visitation right where divorced parents both opposed to it); West v.
West, 689 N.E.2d 1215, 1220-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (paternal grandparents given
visitation right over mother's objection; father had died; court said no order if objec-
tion had been from an intact family); Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 417-18
(Va. 1998) (grandparents' visitation rights denied when married parents both opposed
it).
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the purpose of retention of jurisdiction is protecting the child's best
interests, this outcome is unacceptable. While the function of the legal
process is not necessarily to assist in the children's adjustment to the
divorce, surely its function should not be to impede such adjustment.
In order to determine whether the court's ongoing retention of
jurisdiction in custody cases inhibits the development of normal fam-
ily functioning, it is necessary to define a healthy family. Family
systems theory provides a useful working definition. A functioning
family includes the following characteristics: 1) it is able to adapt to
change; 2) emotional problems are viewed as existing within the unit,
not within a single member; 3) differences between family members
are fostered; 4) there is an emphasis on maintaining and preserving a
positive emotional climate; and 5) the family is a source of feedback
and education."'
Irene and Herbert Goldenberg define the healthy family as one
whose members are able effectively to communicate both thoughts
and feelings. Members within the healthy family expect that their in-
teractions will be open, trusting, and caring. Within the healthy
family there exists a respect for each other's views and each individual
feels free to disagree with the others. 182 The authors state, "[t]he most
capable families demonstrate open, direct expression of humor, ten-
derness, warmth, and hopefulness."'83
These definitions of family will nearly always exclude non-
custodial parents and often exclude joint-legal-custodial parents who
do not live with their children or joint-physical-custodial parents
during the time the children live with the other parent. It will also
exclude other relatives who do not live with a child and, sometimes,
those who do. It often will exclude one parent before a divorce or
custody or support action is commenced, sometimes even while the
parents are living together. If, for example, one parent works long
hours or travels on business or, more harmfully, where one parent is
controlling and abusive. Sometimes children will have two healthy
families, one with each parent, or perhaps more than two if they have
lived for significant time periods with others. Custody means one of
181. For a discussion of these and other characteristics of a functioning family, see Tho-
mas F. Fogarty, M.D., System Concepts and the Dimensions of Self, in FA mLY
THERAPY 144, 149 (Philip J. Guerin, Jr., M.D., ed. 1976).
182. See IRENE GOLDENBERG & HERBERT GOLDENBERG, FAMILY THERAPY: AN OVERVIEW
38-42 (1980).
183. GOLDENBERG & GOLDENBERG, supra note 182, at 42.
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these will be primary, and the one chosen needs to be autonomous. By
failing to recognize that a custodial parent and child(ren) or foster
caregiver(s) and child(ren) can quickly become a family,"' the system
destroys that family's autonomy to the serious detriment of the chil-
dren whose best interests it claims to protect.185
184. The time it takes for children to let go of interrupted parental relationships and form
new ones is two months for those under five, six months for "the younger school-age
child," a year for "the older school-age child," and adult-like time periods for chil-
dren from adolescence to adulthood. See GOLSrEIN ET AL., BEYOND, supra note 134,
at 40-41.
185.
In infancy ... any change in routine leads to food refusals, digestive
upsets, sleeping difficulties, and crying.... Such moves from the familiar
to the unfamiliar cause discomfort, distress, and delays in the infant's ori-
entation and adaptation within his surroundings.
Change of the caretaking person for infants and toddlers further affects
the course of their emotional development... [They suffer] setbacks in the
quality of their next attachments, which will be less trustful. Where conti-
nuity of such relationships is interrupted more than once.... the
children's emotional attachments become increasingly shallow and indis-
criminate.
For young children ... every disruption of continuity also affects those
achievements which are rooted and develop in the intimate interchange
with a stable parent figure.... After separation from the familiar mother,
young children are known to have breakdowns in toilet training and to
lose or lessen their ability to communicate verbally.
For school-age children, the breaks in their relationships with their psy-
chological parents affect above all those achievements which are based on
identification with the parents' demands, prohibitions, and social ide-
als.... [Miade to wander from one environment to another, they may
cease to identify with any set of substitute parents. Resentment toward the
adults who have disappointed them in the past makes them adopt the at-
titude of not caring for anybody; or of making the new parent the
scapegoat for the shortcomings of the former one. In any case, multiple
placement at these ages puts many children beyond the reach of educa-
tional influence, and becomes the direct cause of behavior which the
schools experience as disrupting and the courts label as dissocial, delin-
quent, or even criminal.
With adolescents, the superficial observation of their behavior may
convey the idea that what they desire is discontinuation of parental rela-
tionships rather than their preservation and stability.... It is true that
their revolt against any parental authority is normal developmentally since
it is the adolescent's way toward establishing his own independent adult
identity. But for a successful outcome it is important that the breaks and
disruptions of attachment should come exclusively from his side and not be
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Even when courts think it best to leave the family alone, the legal
rights of extra-familial parents, grandparents, legal parents, child wel-
fare agencies, and even the public require results the judge may
despise. The system has assumed that single parents can not succeed
alone and has thus destroyed their "uninterrupted opportunity to meet
the developing physical and emotional needs of their child[ren] so as
to establish the familial bonds critical to every child's healthy growth
and development."' 86 For children in foster care, those bonds are often
destroyed over and over again as courts and agencies move them from
home to foster care to home again or to placement with adopters, each
change doing further harm.1
7
While the legal system accepted other recommendations offered
in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,8 it emphatically rejected the
firm statement that:
Once it is determined who will be the custodial parent, it is
that parent, not the court, who must decide under what
conditions he or she wishes to raise the child. Thus, the
noncustodial parent should have no legally enforceable right
to visit the child, and the custodial parent should have the
right to decide whether it is desirable for the child to have
such visits. What we have said is designed to protect the se-
curity of an ongoing relationship-that between the child
and the custodial parent. At the same time the state neither
makes nor breaks the psychological relationship between the
child and the noncustodial parent, which the adults involved
imposed on him by any form of abandonment or rejection on the psycho-
logical parents' part.
Adults who as children suffered from disruptions of continuity may
themselves, in "identifying" with their many "parents," treat their children
as they themselves were treated-continuing a cycle costly for both a new
generation of children as well as for society itself.
GOLDSrEIN ET AL., BEYOND, supra note 134, at 32-34.
Thus, continuity is a guideline because emotional attachments are tenuous and
vulnerable in early life and need stability of external arrangements for their develop-
ment. See, GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND, supra note 134, at 32-34.
186. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 9-10.
187. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 39-51; GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BE-
YOND, supra note 134, at 39.
188. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND, supra note 134.
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may have jeopardized. It leaves to them what only they can
ultimately resolve.!89
At the time the book was written, there were no statutory grand-
parent visitation rights, but one may infer that these, too, are
detrimental to children's best interests, which are supposed to be the
court's top priority even when the "rights" of (politically powerful)
fathers and grandparents are at stake. Sixteen years after that first edi-
tion was published, the same authors wrote another book
demonstrating that the state's intervention into families was destroy-
ing children pulled into the child welfare system.19 The rights of
children's agencies, genetic parents, and the courts themselves have
often been given higher priority than the best interests of the children
involved in abuse, neglect, and failed adoptions. Once again, the harm
overlooked in the system was the damage done to family integrity and
children's need for continuity by the very act of intervention itself.
Such harm can only be justified when intervention is the only way to
prevent even worse harm likely to occur if the state fails to intervene.
D. Lofry Aims-Danger to Children
The present child welfare system and post-divorce-decree litiga-
tion involving children frequently substitute the judgment of social
workers, lawyers, and judges for that of parents in settings where there
is no serious risk of harm greater than interruption of continuity and
loss of family integrity. 9 It also disbelieves serious abuse claims ar-
ticulated by both parents and children and substitutes its inventions
for both truth and facts, allowing sexual abuse and beatings clearly
beyond reasonable discipline to continue until children die, run away
successfully, or reach adulthood.
92
Yet most of the people in the system hold, at least when they
begin to work in the system, a good-faith belief that they are saving
children, or at least improving their lot, and that their work is good
and necessary. The explanation, in addition to the political and
189. GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND, supra note 134, at 38 and accompanying notes (discussing the
author's opposition to contrary language in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
and comparing this law to the custody law in Japan).
190. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEST INTERESTS, supra note 122.
191. See infra notes 210-212.
192. See infra note 213.
2000]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
gender issues already discussed, lies in unrealistic goals, false and
unexamined assumptions, and the mixed motives always present in
human action.
E. Unrealistic Goals andAssumptions
Our need.., to check one another's treatment of children is
not limited to the ... minimalist agenda of protecting chil-
dren from physical violence or brutal conditions of
deprivation. Because society's future is always in its chil-
dren's keeping, we must focus as well on affirmative
conditions of well-being. In various ways, our society ex-
presses its visions of what its children should be: well-
housed, well-fed, healthy, physically fit, well-educated, well-
rounded, competitive, caring, and culturally enriched.' 3
"Human services has a utopian outlook."' 9 The ancient Greeks
knew that utopias were unrealizable ideals; the word can be translated
as "nowhere."' 9' Lawyers, law professors, social workers, and politi-
cians often believe that unrealistic goals can be achieved for all
children. They believe it in the face of hundreds and thousands of
dismal failures, and, believing, they do untold harm to children, inter-
vening in the names of neglect and treatment to destroy the best
parent-child relationships available to countless children. The goals
cannot be attained, but the system keeps trying, hoping the next
dream will come true.
At the same time, the perfectibility of families is a cherished
myth, and return to the family of origin or adoptive placement are the
two ends of the rainbow. The system pronounces the parent(s) either
fixed or hopeless, moves the children again, and declares the case suc-
cessfully closed, sometimes immediately and sometimes after a few
more weeks or months or years of supervision-treatment-intrusion.
But genetic families that work well while the children are away in
foster care often don't work any better than they did before children
193. Ira C. Lupu, The Separation ofPowers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1317, 1327-28 (1994).
194. ARmSTRONG, supra note 114, at 281.
195. Cf STIG STROMHOLM, A SHORT HIsToRy OF LEGAL THINKING IN THE WST 30-31
(1985) (noting that even Plato began to evidence doubt of the possibility of creating
utopia in his later writings).
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were removed once the children are returned to live with their parents
again. And the children once returned may suffer renewed sexual or
physical abuse which leaves them their lives but destroys their spirits.
The process may take long enough that the children may suffer twice
(or more) the destruction of continuity--once when they are removed
from home into foster care and again when they are removed from
foster homes into the families they came from or adoptive families.
Also, agencies, and statutes drafted under their influence, prefer
compliant parents who cooperate in making the efforts dictated by the
agencies and who find ways to protect children, even where the state
and the society are unable to do so, from an abusive other parent. '96 It
is unrealistic to assume that the parents' views of what their children
need are always inferior to the agencies' views or that parents who
have done everything humanly possible to protect children, with little
or no help from courts or agencies, should nonetheless lose their chil-
dren because they cannot do something that works. The system is
biased against parents who resist intervention because it is assumed
that the state knows best.
"A child can't wait five years for a home. So they make a home.
They settle in wherever you put them. Unless it's really awful. Even if
it's pretty awful, they settle in."' 97 Wrongly believing that every child
can and should have the social mainstream's idea of a good home, the
system itself destroys the homes children do have. This is how the
system makes so many errors of both under-intervention and over-
intervention. First, it assumes it can fix families; then, it assumes that
only the compliant can be fixed, and then, it assumes that reasonably
cooperative families are fixed.
196. The Illinois statute, for example, includes as grounds for a finding of unfitness a
parent's "[flailure to protect the child from conditions within his [the child's] envi-
ronment injurious to [his/her] welfare" and failure to make efforts "to correct the
conditions which were the basis for the removal." 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 50/1(D)
(West 1998). Thus, a parent who disputes the state's allegations and suggestions from
the beginning-asserting family autonomy-is more likely to be found unfit; so is a
parent whose best efforts are not sufficient to protect the child from the other parent,
despite the fact that the state has also failed to protect the child from those actions-
actions caused by neither the parent before the court nor the state.
197. ARmSTRONG, supra note 114, at 281.
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F. Power Corrupts, and....
Humanity's "dark side" has been recognized since the beginning
of recorded history."8 It is easily seen in those who seriously abuse or
neglect their own children. It is less readily apparent in the helping
professionals of law, medicine, and social-work, but it is there. Its low
visibility, born of scientific myths and false expectations, makes it in-
sidiously more dangerous.
When someone threatens another's perceptions of the way things
are and ought to be, the perceiver wants to make the "misfit" either fit
her world view or go away.'" If it is possible to do either with little
enough struggle so that she can keep her expectations intact, she will
be strongly motivated to do it.2' This motivation, especially if it is not
recognized and addressed, leads directly to unnecessary intervention,
not, as interveners believe, to help anyone, but to restore the interve-
nor's level of comfort. The intervener refers the "problem" to others-
social agencies, foster parents, state's attorneys, doctors, residential
care facilities, counselors, etc.,-and escapes. If not-if she remains
involved-she asserts power to control the "misfit" and the "misfit's"
family and uses it, in ever increasing cycles, to distance these non-
persons from herself.
21
'
Societal "co-dependence" allows "enablers" to avoid dealing with
their own issues by attending to others' issues. Since no one can, in
fact, control anyone but herself, this activity can continue indefinitely,
allowing everyone involved to be non-responsible for the absence of
positive change and unaware of the dynamic at work.2 2 The power
imbalance, distancing helper from helpee, coupled with self unaware-
ness can keep the status quo operative for years-certainly for the
whole time of many children's development from birth to adulthood.
However, someone, probably another powerful player in the
legal-political-agency child welfare world, may well ask what is being
198. See, e.g., Genesis 3:1-4:16 (Adam's and Eve's sin leading to "the fall" of humankind,
and, some say, of all creation, and Cain's murder of Abel).
199. See ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS Vi (1979).
200. See BURT, supra note 199, at 22-45 (explaining, for example, the confinement to
hospitals of the mentally ill who presented no threat beyond their difference from the
normal).
201. See BURT, supra note 199, at 22-45.
202. See generally, SCHAEF, supra note 116, at 29-33 (discussing the addictive system and
co-dependence).
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accomplished. Society's faith in science has led the actors in the
system to call their work "treatment," which allows the intervenor to
persuade the other players to leave her alone because 1) only she has
the needed expertise and 2) her machinations are presumptively
helpful and medical, not intrusive, controlling, or destructive. °4 The
fellow-intervenors can be justified in escaping to a safely distant
vantage point to wait for science to solve the problem of the "misfit's"
difference.
A crasser, more familiar problem is self-interest. If child welfare
workers leave good-enough families alone and protect seriously en-
dangered children by removing the endangerors or finding permanent
placements with new caregivers, their current caseloads will no longer
justify the plethora of social workers, juvenile court employees, and
bureaucrats currently working within the system. The real possibility
of losing her job may be sufficient to distract the intervenor from ex-
ploring questions about the efficacy, good sense, motivations, and
ethical stance of her work, if and when such issues arise.
It would be easy to classify intervenors as "they" and protect chil-
dren from "their" dark sides, but, by definition, the person who makes
the suggestion and undertakes the proposed "protection" becomes an
intervenor.20' All human beings have the motivations described above;
reform of the system requires awareness of their presence and ways to
minimize their effects.
VII. FIXING A BROKEN CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
It would be difficult to find anyone who does not see any need to
improve the current child welfare system in the United States. Repub-
licans want to stop spending so much money on it and to preserve
families. Democrats want to identify and remove its weaknesses to
203. See generally, BURT, supra note 199, at 81-83 (discussing a variation of Milgram's
shockexperiment where a non-scientific person orders the volunteer to continue ad-
ministering shocks to a protesting person. In this variation, significantly fewer people
obeyed the order to continue the shocks); STANLEY MILGRIM, OBEDIENCE TO
AuTHoRITY 93-97 (1974).
204. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 114, at 245-84.
205. It should be noted that intervention often pits a partnership of intervenors-judges,
caseworkers, police, etc.,-against parents. It is easy to do damage to a good-enough
family if all participants outside the family cooperate to make the family look bad
and reinforce their own self-justifications.
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benefit children and save money. Libertarians want families left alone.
Socialists want a more effective system with visible benefits for chil-
dren. The philosophies discussed above translated into political parties
can all agree that the system is broken. Its clients hate it; other par-
ticipants agree that it only sometimes works. Agreement breaks down,
however, when discussion turns to agenda for reform.
A. What a Century20 6 of Child Welfare Work Should Teach
the Law about Best Interests
Vastly increased divorce rates of the last fifty years, rising
numbers of births among unwed parents, non-payment of child
support, and (mis) classification of households of divorced parents
and single parents as per se dysfunctional have combined to
overwhelm the child welfare system. It has mushroomed into a many-
headed monster that can do nothing but grow as long as reform is
sought to be accomplished by adding things. The system itself has
become part of the problem, perhaps more often than it participates
in solving problems for children. Alarm bells have been sounding for
a quarter of a century, 7 but the system has changed for the worse
more than for the better. It has intervened to destroy continuity of
care and parental autonomy, both of paramount importance to child
development, in the lives of steadily increasing numbers of
children.08 The best interests of children must be redefined to
promote continuity and autonomy for all children not seriously and
imminently endangered in their current living situations, and to
protect those things in the new placements chosen for seriously
endangered children unless they are again seriously endangered
there. °9 It is not in the best interests of children to destroy the bonds
and security they have in order to provide larger living quarters;
2'0
206. Custody cases have been around for well over 100 years, but the child welfare system
is more a product of juvenile court acts, the first of which was enacted in 1899. See
supra note 99 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., GoLDSTEIM ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 3-14.
208. See supra notes 180-190 and accompanying text.
209. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND, supra note 134, at 6-8.
210. See, e.g., ARmSTRONG, supra note 114, at 340 n.1 (discussing the case of a woman
who placed her child in foster care for two weeks while she had necessary surgery and
spent two years seeking return of her child because, the agency said, her house was too
small for her, her son, her father, and her brother). Can anyone doubt that this un-
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cleanliness, genetic connections; restoration of long broken ties;
or parents' legal rights.
Changes in the understanding of best interests have happened
many times, but the child's interests have always been said to be
paramount. Ironically, the very rejection of balancing children's best
interests against any other considerations has driven such balancing
underground. Judges presume that contact with both parents is best
warranted intervention and removal (failure to return) did vastly more harm than
good?
211. I recently learned of a case in the Chicago suburbs where children were summarily
removed from a filthy home with rotting food and other debris all over the floor and
the furniture. DCFS was called by a neighbor whose son had been invited into the
filthy home by one of the children who lived there. Should children live in filth? No.
Should the house be cleaned and the parents' depression treated? Yes. Should the ac-
tive, healthy children have been snatched from their lifelong home and handed to
strangers? In my opinion, no. It seems cavalier at best to interrupt established conti-
nuity and autonomy by removing children where such things are the only risks of
harm. An evidentiary hearing should precede removal where, as here, there is no im-
mediate danger. Horrified social workers or police, perhaps gently reared and filled
with idealistic notions of a home like their own for every child, should not be free to
make such a momentous decision on the spur of the moment and on their own.
When the author was about ten years old, a classmate of hers was being repeat-
edly dragged by one arm through a backyard fire by his angry father. A passer-by
called the police, and they took the child to the county farm until the court could
act. That is an appropriately immediate removal; court review within days after re-
moval is sufficient. However, if another adult caregiver-e.g. mother-had been
present, it would be a better, less intrusive intervention in the child's best interests to
remove the abusive father.
212. See, In Re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 338-40 (Il. 1995) (the famous "Baby Rich-
ard" case) (granting custody to blood father who had never met his child after child
lived from infancy to age four with adoptive parents).
213. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 144-82. Maria Caldwell, a British
girl, died at the age of seven at the hands of her stepfather after having spent almost
ten consecutive months of roughly the first fifteen months of her life with her aunt
and uncle, returning to them as official foster caregivers under the authority of the
government's child protection agency four months later and remaining there for the
next five years. The aunt and uncle wanted to adopt her. The agency thought they
were good parents to Maria, but, after forced visits to her mother's household over
several months, six-year old Maria was returned to her mother, despite her consistent
but futile resistance. Maria's mother had remarried some years earlier. Neighbors and
teachers said that Maria was losing weight, that she was locked in her bedroom for
long periods of time, and that she was seriously bruised on several occasions. Moreo-
ver, these reports went to different offices and were not coordinated in time to save
her life. Maria Colwell was born March 25, 1965, and died January 7, 1973. See
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE, supra note 111, at 144-82.
2000]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
for children even when one parent is abusive.214 Judges presume that it
is in the best interests of the child that other parents be deterred from
child-snatching. Legislators presume that it is in children's best inter-
ests to be with their genetic parents even if flawed adoption
proceedings or long-term foster care have allowed stronger ties to
form with non-genetic parents.215 If courts and agencies were allowed
overtly to balance parental interests against children's interests, for
example, the weight of serious sexual abuse might more readily be
seen to be greater than abusers' rights to see their children.
Juvenile courts have survived failed claims to predict delinquency,
failed claims that child-criminals can be rehabilitated, and failed
claims that every child can have a utopian childhood. It should be
clear by now that families should be kept together in the first place
unless children are seriously endangered and a better placement than
the child's present situation is known to be available. It should be
clear that intervention damages family autonomy and that removal
damages continuity. The longer each continues, the greater the dam-
age done. Those factors should be important in determining what a
"better" placement is. If the child is not seriously endangered, no ac-
tion should be taken. If a home is filthy, it should be cleaned, but
children should not be removed from a stable environment unless the
danger from that environment clearly exceeds the inevitable damage
to continuity that removal will bring. No action should be taken un-
less the danger in the present situation clearly exceeds the inevitable
damage to family autonomy any ordered or coerced alternative will
bring.
Courts hearing custody and visitation disputes should have
learned that those who have been good parents, involved in children's
lives before the dispute arose, are likely to be good parents after it is
resolved, and those who haven't. are likely to continue not to be.216
They should have learned that post-decree litigation usually results
from ongoing animosity or ongoing attempts by one parent to control
the other. Where these factors are not present, parents work out ways
to cope with changed circumstances. If the parties are told to work it
214. See e.g., supra Part VI.B. The author has encountered several such cases over twenty
years of advising battered spouses and their children, and the current controversy
over allegations of sexual abuse by visiting parents is indicative of problems here.
215. See e.g., supra Part VI.E.
216. ' See Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long-Term Effects ofDivorce on Children: A Review, 30
J. AM. AcAD. CHILD & ADOLEscENT PSYCHIATRY 349 (1991).
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out themselves, and the custodial parent's decisions govern if they
can't agree, 217 the court need do nothing. Parties will lose an impor-
tant weapon fostering ongoing animosity and control.
It is antithetical to everything in the history, philosophy, and tra-
dition of parenspatriae (except the notion that one-parent families are
per se dysfunctional) for courts to second guess parents who have
reached agreements on custody, child support, visitation, and place of
residence of their children; even if the parents are before the court to
seek a divorce or determination of parentage, and even if other issues
are contested. If parents seek court resolution of a dispute between
them as to custody, child support, or parentage, the court should de-
cide that dispute, at least if mediation or other conciliatory resolutions
have not resolved the conflict. Parents who never sought divorces or
paternity orders could agree to live apart, trade visitation for money,
or whatever else they chose to do. It is both unjust and irrational that
those who do seek one of these remedies should have to accept state
intrusion into their joint parental decisions as part of the price of that
dispute resolution.
Culturally, such intrusions are highly likely to favor keeping the
cultural mainstream intact, an arguably impermissible exercise of the
state's parens patriae power, and pose a serious threat to family auton-
217. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND, supra note 134, at 37 (asserting custody decisions
should not be modifiable). The authors proposed, in 1973, that custodial parents
should decide visitation issues, because of the importance of protecting the relation-
ship between the custodial parent and the child, thus filfilling the child's need for
continuity. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND, supra note 134, at 37-38. At that time,
this author was among the many lawyers and others who thought it would give cus-
todial parents a license to use children to hurt former spouses and their families. Both
experience and reading Burt's Taking Care of Strangers have changed this author's
view. If courts refuse to declare winners and losers, parties will work things out, espe-
cially once all parties become accustomed to being thus empowered. This accords
with the views of Burt in other areas, like consent to medical treatment. See, BURT,
supra note 116, at vi-vii. Parents, like doctors, families, and patients, are more likely
to create balanced, sensible agreements if the courts refuse to coerce them or decide
for them. Court actions are a club the legal system should not use. It is contrary to
parenspatriae theory to intervene when the (new, single-parent) family has not failed.
It is harmful to children to destroy parental power and autonomy and to live with
endless hostilities. In my opinion parents can manage post-decree custody conflicts at
least as well as courts can. The rule proposed would, for example, destroy the incen-
tive to make false claims of child abuse against noncustodial parents and would save
children from ongoing abuse where true claims are recognized by custodial parents
but badly handled or disbelieved in court. Where two parents have been healthily in-
volved with their children, they will work out ways to continue that involvement;
where they have nor, forcing involvement is far more likely to do harm than good.
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omy, particularly when one considers how many children have parents
who seek divorces. The proper setting for establishing parameters of
acceptable parental conduct are neglect cases, tort actions, and crimi-
nal cases, with strict and mostly statutory guidelines, not in divorce
cases where judicial discretion is legendary and statutory factors noto-
riously broad and general.
Those whose expertise is in child psychology and development
have been saying these things for many years.218 It is time for law to
hear their voices before the system directly damages thousands more
children. The importance of continuity and of family autonomy, sup-
ported by history and philosophy as well as by experts discussing
children's basic needs, should be recognized. Best interests of children
should be paramount in decision-making and not just in rhetoric.
The last lesson to be explicated here is that only the youngest of
children are as helpless and voiceless as the law often presumes all mi-
nors to be. Children's wishes can be ascertained, and their motivations
evaluated, from the time they can say meaningful sentences until they
come of age. The system should learn to seek those wishes more often
and to place the children's perspectives before decision-makers. As
children develop, their knowledge increases and their judgment ma-
tures. Just as the best predictor of future behavior of a violent spouse
is probably the opinion of the victim, so also may the child's opinion
be a reliable guide to parental dangerousness. The system's experience
also teaches much about how to solicit children's input, and that lit-
erature too should be used within the legal system more than it has
been to date. 9
218. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEST INTERESTS, supra note 122, at 11, 17, 62-63; GOLD-
STEIN ET AL., BEYOND, supra note 134, at 37-38.
219. Exploration of this topic is beyond the scope of the present work, but there is much
current literature on it. See, e.g., Meredith Sherman Fahn, Allegations of Child Sexual
Abuse In Custodial Disputes: Getting to the Truth of the Matter, 14 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 123 (1991); Elizabeth Ann Gibbons, Surveying Massachusetts' ChildAbuse Laws:
The Best Protection for Children?, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107 (1992); John E. B. My-
ers, Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation Litigation:
Recommendations For Improved Fact Finding and Child Protection, 28 J. FAm. L. 1
(1989).
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B. Don'tJust Do Something; Stand There
The child welfare system needs to shrink, to intervene in fewer
families, to close cases more quickly, to recognize the damage done by
its very attempts to help children as well as by its authoritarian med-
dling and bureaucratic self-preservation. It needs, in far more cases
than it does now, to do nothing. Utopian goals, false assumptions, too-
facile definitions of family "dysfunction," the dark side within each
person involved in every case, and habit all combine to encourage un-
necessary interventions that can only make children's lives worse and
move us to return children, after too long, to families which are not
"fixed" and will endanger them again. Rules and heavy caseloads lead
the system to demand cooperative compliance and to discourage self-
help, especially if it goes against mainstream stereotypes. Privately
working things out is often the best solution and compliance bespeaks
a surrendering of family autonomy, a giving up, which bodes ill for
children.
Some of the changes proposed here should or must be statutory,
but if every person involved in child welfare agencies, juvenile court
non-delinquency cases, custody disputes, and post-divorce litigation
were to begin today seriously to consider doing nothing as a real op-
tion in those situations, the positive impact on the welfare of countless
children would be breathtaking. It would be a good beginning.
CONCLUSION
Consideration of legal philosophies, the history of parens patriae,
the number of children damaged by the child welfare system, and
those it fails to help when they need it leads to several proposals for
reform. Their adoption would facilitate a real focus on the well-being
of children.
In a custody dispute between parents, married or not, the court
should first determine whether or not anyone is a psychological parent
to the child. The preferred custodian is a parent who is also a psycho-
logical parent unless that person presents a serious danger to the child.
If there are two (or more) such parents, or if there is no psychological
parent, the court should place the child with the parent who is the
least detrimental available alternative. If all parents present a serious
threat, the case should be referred to the juvenile court.
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If custody is not disputed, but parents are in court to seek di-
vorce, parentage determination, child support, or any other family
remedy, the court should not inquire into the child's best interests as
to custody and should, as in all other related matters, order whatever
the parties have agreed unless it is unconscionable.220 Once custody
has been determined, by the court or by agreement-made-court-order,
the court should close the custody case. It should not determine visi-
tation or retain jurisdiction to modify or enforce its custody order, to
hear removal petitions, or to continue oversight of the child's best in-
terests. This should not change present methods of enforcing other
provisions in the order.
Where sole custody is awarded to one parent, all subsequent pa-
rental decisions should belong to the custodial parent. Where parents
are awarded joint custody, the court may order parental participation
in mediation to resolve future disputes, but, if one parent refuses to
participate without good cause, the other parent's decisions should
govern. Only a showing of serious endangerment in juvenile court
should trigger intervention into the new, post-divorce family, just as
such a showing can bring intervention into any other family.
In juvenile court cases of neglect, abuse, and dependency, the ex-
isting placement should be continued unless it presents serious
endangerment to the child. Pending determination of juvenile court
jurisdiction, the child should remain where she is unless there is an
immediate risk of serious harm likely to occur before the hearing can
be held. If a child's placement is proposed to be changed during the
intake process, a court hearing should be held first or, if immediate
removal is necessary under the standard above, within a few days af-
terward. Time is different for children, and continuity is important.
Great harm is often done before any harm resulting from inaction has
been reasonably found to have occurred or even to be likely. The
standard for destroying the continuity in a child's life, even temporar-
ily, should be a demonstrated risk of serious endangerment. That
demonstration should be made to a court. If a juvenile court has
authorized removal of a child from her present living situation,
changing physical custody, after the child has come to treat her new
caregivers as family, should require the same process as any other re-
moval. When a child has lived in one family for the time it takes to
form psychological parenthood at that child's age, the juvenile court
220. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE Acr § 306, 9A U.L.A. 248-49 (1998).
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should close the case, and any child welfare agencies involved should
leave the new family alone unless or until the foster caregivers are un-
able or unwilling to continue.
When parents seek help from juvenile courts or child welfare
agencies, whether or not the help sought is available, the state and its
agents should not, without the same cause required in other cases,
launch a general investigation of the family. Seeking specific help is
not equivalent to family failure and should not set in motion the exer-
cise of parens patriae powers and duties. Redirection of a portion of
resources presently used to intervene inappropriately to provide the
varied help which families might seek as a part of autonomous family
decision making might work wonders in society. The cost of un-
wanted parenting classes, for example, might be spent on babysitters
or new tires for safe transportation of children or the expenses of
sending children to "free" public schools--or whatever families need
and can't afford.
Children themselves should be consulted by courts whenever thay
are able to communicate. The court should seek both their placement
preferences and reasons for those preferences and their opinions on
parental or other caregiver dangerousness, strengths, and weaknesses.
This input from the children should be accomplished in accord with
the best methods and safeguards agreeable to child-development psy-
chologists on the one hand and parental parties' constitutional rights
advocates on the other. Simple means should be created to allow chil-
dren to initiate proceedings on their own behalf, although care must
be taken to discourage children from "crying wolf," either on their
own or at the behest of non-custodial parents disempowered by these
reforms.
Finally, a lot of bureaucratic expense could be saved with more
trusting cooperation among the layers of government and citizens.
Federal funding may be necessary to redistribute money from richer
states to poorer states, and state funding to do the same within states,
but there is no need for the strings always attached to distributions of
such money. Reports and statistics (with identifying information, ad-
dresses, etc., removed) produced at the level where services are
provided should be made available, preferably electronically, to
whomever needs them, and computers can produce whatever organi-
zation of them is needed. It is not a benefit to children whose families
have truly failed to have multiple layers of staff rewrite and reorganize
and regulate all the information anyone can think of wanting about
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their lives and troubles. Good enough parenting is good enough, and
is the best society can do. Good enough accounting is all society needs
to afford; we don't need to spend millions of dollars to keep track of
every dollar of public money spent on the welfare of children (or any
other program). Citizens who are intended to benefit can be trusted to
complain about misuse of benefits or services if a useable process is in
place, and local distributors of benefits can be trusted to complain if
clients cheat. When cooperative skulduggery happens, local people are
more likely to notice than are distant bureaucrats reading (probably
falsified) reports. When decisions are made by those affected by them,
things work out; when the uninvolved take control, both the dark side
of "help" and self-interested preservation of control are given oppor-
tunity to flourish. The best interests of children are not served.
Both governmental philosophies consistent with parenspatriae are
well served by the reforms proposed here. Limited government
proponents must applaud that government may intervene in familial
decision-making only when family members seek court adjudication
or when a court is satisfied that children are seriously endangered.
General welfare proponents must applaud that government may
intervene in familial decision-making only when its intervention will
do more good than harm or when families seek government help.
Consulting children when courts do become involved fosters both
their liberty and their well-being. Empowering custodial, single
parents likewise fosters their liberty and the well-being of them and
their children. Closing cases sooner, reducing governmental costs and
bureaucracy, and lightening caseloads allow for both smaller
government and more efficient governmental function.
Parens patriae is a doctrine which says that children whose
families fail should be protected and cared for by government. It is
not, and should not become, a doctrine of public oversight of all
child-rearing in the paternalistic mode. The destruction of family
autonomy and continuity of care for children who come to the
attention of government through cases of divorce, parentage, de-
pendency, neglect allegations, or abuse allegations, seem far more
likely candidates than single-parent families to be among the causes of
dangerous disaffection among young adults. They are also an abuse of
government's power and a perversion of parens patriae. If family
failure is realistically defined and required to be demonstrated in court
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before children are removed from homes or parents are removed from
decision-making, children whose families have truly failed can be
helped without vast expenditure or ongoing government supervision.
Such reform is, indeed, in the children's best interests. t

